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I. JUDICIAL CONFUSION AND CHAOS THEORY
Chaos theory, “[w]hen the present determines the future, but the
approximate present does not approximately determine the future,”1
is now undermining the legal precedent controlling the second most
important invention in human history.2 Courts cannot determine how
to legally adjudicate electricity, which has a transacted value in the
U.S. of approximately $390 billion annually,3 exceeding the total
amount of corporate income taxes collected in the U.S.4 In four basic
areas of law, how courts characterize electricity makes a critical out-
come-determinative distinction on individual rights and legal
remedies:
1. Christopher M. Danforth, Chaos in an Atmosphere Hanging on a Wall, MATH-
EMATICS PLANET EARTH, http://mpe.dimacs.rutgers.edu/2013/03/17/chaos-in-an-at-
mosphere-hanging-on-a-wall/ [https://perma.cc/23N5-9UZR] (crediting the statement
to Edward N. Lorenz); see also Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic Non-Periodic Flow,
20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCIS. 130 (1963). Chaos theory refers to systems whose future
behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements in-
volved. Electricity is a constant element in the U.S. economy, with no significant ran-
dom elements. However, with chaos theory, the deterministic nature of these systems
does not make them predictable. And judicial determinations about electricity have
been neither predictable nor consistent, as set forth below in this Article.
2. James Fallows, The Fifty Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 2013, at 56.
3. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2014 tbl. 2.3
(Feb. 2016), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf.
4. Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL’Y CTR (Feb. 4, 2015), http:/
/www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203 [https://perma.cc/
9JYH-KELL].
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• In contract law: Whether electricity is a “good” governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) or a service gov-
erned by different distinct rules under varying state common
law. This is increasingly important with seventeen states now
deregulating power in favor of contract law.5
• In tort law: Whether electricity is a “product” governed by
strict products liability law, or a service not subject to strict
liability when there is injury.
• In bankruptcy law: Whether creditors of the bankrupt party
can recover their money first as a preferential administrative
claim because electricity is deemed a “good” rather than a
service.
• In antitrust law: Controlling when electricity is a “commodity”
rather than a service, anticompetitive behavior is punished
under the Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act. The dis-
tinction controls U.S. commerce.
Choice of law affects legal outcomes at the core of Anglo-American
law. This Article analyzes what electricity is, how the law regards it,
and concludes by examining the confusion and inconsistency created
by many courts. Even finishing second among the most important in-
ventions in history (second behind only the movable type printing
press)6 highlights the essential role of electricity in the American
economy: Among the most important inventions in human history,
electricity is the only one which also is essential and irreplaceable to
operate seven other of the “top 50” inventions of all time: the In-
ternet, computers, air-conditioning, radio, television, the telephone,
and semiconductors.7
The importance of the law for electricity is now amplified in the
twenty-first century: Recent electric sector deregulation and competi-
tion in which state common law contract replaces systematized gov-
ernment regulation is now adopted in 40% of the states and by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commis-
sion”). The thirteen states deregulating electric power entirely and the
seven other states allowing some limited choice are shown below in
Figure 1.8 Independent market participants in electric power increas-
ingly sell their power under common law contract where rules of com-
mon law increasingly are critical.9
5. See infra Figure 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFI-
CIENCY AND RENEWABLES 218–19 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
9. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. F.E.R.C., 471 F.3d 1053, 1066–67
(9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
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FIGURE 1: RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKETS10
There is inconsistent precedent and jurisprudential confusion in
four key areas of law between states, within states, between state and
federal regulators, and between judges within the same state. Califor-
nia court determinations, for example, exhibit judicial inconsistency
and confusion:
• Electricity is personal property.11
• Electricity is a product (for tort products liability) and may also
be a good.12
• Electricity is a service until it is metered.13
• Electricity is an intangible service.14
Judicial confusion extends to other states:
10. Retail Electricity Markets, COMPETE COALITION, http://www.competecoalition.
com/files/Retail%20Electricity%20Markets.pdf.
11. Hill v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 136 P. 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913).
12. Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 82 (1985).
13. Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 232 Cal. App. 3d 88, 101 (1991).
14. Appeal of PacifiCorp., California State Board of Equalization, No. 90027,
Sept. 12, 2002 (“[T]he sales of electricity here are sales of services that essentially
consisted of appellant’s setting and keeping in motion, through its generation and
transmission facilities, electrically charged particles. Also as in Otte, we further con-
clude that the basic reason the generation and transmission process employed by ap-
pellant is appropriately characterized as a service is that the process does not result in
either (1) the “creation” in its generation facilities of any such arguably tangible parti-
cles or (2) the “injection” of those particles into its transmission facilities.”).
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• Massachusetts determined that the same electricity is a “good”15
in bankruptcy and a service in contract law.16
• Texas, flipping the Massachusetts jurisprudence on its head, de-
termined that electricity is a service rather than a “good” in
bankruptcy,17 and the same electricity in contract law is a
“good” rather than a service.18
After a century of such judicial inconsistency regarding exactly
identical electricity, there is a pattern of significant legal confusion
and inconsistency among the states and even within leading states.
Chaos theory19 is hard-wired in the electricity jurisprudence: Some
courts are not engaged in analyzing what electricity is, and thus which
set of very different legal rules must govern its commerce, use, and
impacts. The confusion exists at both federal and state levels, and in
judicial and executive/administrative branch adjudications.
Analyzing both the science and the law, this Article charts where
states are on legal jurisprudence in four cornerstone areas of law and
builds from there to a consistent solution for this unresolved legal is-
sue. To lay the core foundation, Part II examines the physics of elec-
tricity to determine what it is, its unique role in modern society, and
how it should be viewed by the law. Part III analyzes key inconsistent
court precedent deeming electricity to be covered by contract law as a
tangible “good” or an intangible service, as well as the respective dis-
sonant consequences. Part IV analyzes the confusion when state law
interchangeably treats electricity inconsistently as either a service or a
product for application of tort products liability law. Parts V and VI
analyze the inconsistent legal treatment of electricity in bankruptcy
and anti-trust matters. These four sections comprehensively chart the
scope of the confusion in four core areas of the law.
Inconsistent legal decisions about the same thing—electricity—in
the same state, creates unresolved confusion in four fundamental ar-
eas of the law. However, while dissonance can be overcome on minor
aspects of law, as examined in this Article, it creates confusion and
chaos when applied to the second most important invention of all
time. Choice of law matters. Electricity particularly matters in the
twenty-first century. There is no area of legal confusion that has a
more fundamental impact on modern society. The concluding Part of
this Article provides the scope of resolution for this existing judicial
conflict and chaos.
15. See In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354, 374 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
16. See New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996
WL 406673 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
17. See In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
18. See Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988) (“We
agree with the better reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions which hold electricity to
be a product.” Id. at 785.).
19. See Fallows, supra note 2.
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We start with the science and physics—the facts are critical here for
the law.
II. WHAT’S THE BUZZ? LAW MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PHYSICS OF THE UNIVERSE
From the moment that electricity was first harnessed,20 the most
prominent scientists of the era who formulated the basic laws of elec-
tricity and magnetism stated that while a physical force, it was not a
physical substance that could be categorized as an article similar to
any other physical substance in commerce:
While admitting electricity, as we have now done, to the rank of a
physical quantity, we must not too hastily assume that it is, or is not,
a substance, or that it is, or is not, a form of energy, or that it be-
longs to any known category of physical quantities.21
For the last century, if not during the first quarter-century after its
harnessing, electricity has not changed as a uniform thing in American
commerce.22 It is still the energized electrical-magnetic force transmit-
ted in a nationwide transmission and distribution system. It is identical
in every state at every moment: An energy field transmitted as alter-
nating current at 60 Hz and cycles per second.23 While its voltage is
transformed on different lines, its critical status and movement are
constant in every state, in every transaction, and at every moment. It
is never anything else.
The electromagnetic force is one of the four known primary forces
in the universe. The so-called weak force and the electromagnetic
force are united in quantum field theory, and both are associated with
ripples in the fabric of space-time.24 An invisible force is not typically
considered a product or “good.”
A. Quantum Fields
Electric circuits are the physical means for conveying energy in a
force field to different places, but always within the line or attach-
ments to it.25 Current flows through electric circuits. Current is the
20. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REG-
ULATION 260–61 (Pennwell Publishers 2000).
21. JAMES CLARK MAXWELL, A TREATISE ON ELECTRICITY AND MAGNETISM
§ 35 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 3d ed. 1904).
22. For a history of electric power, see STEVEN FERREY, supra note 20, at Appen-
dix A. Until the early twentieth century, electricity was supplied at different voltages
ranging from 100–600 volts and 40–133 cycles per second, by different suppliers. For
the past century, it is standardized throughout the United States at a set frequency of
alternating current.
23. WORLD ELECTRICITY STANDARDS, http://www.quantumbalancing.com/
worldelectricity/electricityif.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6QA-FKKH].
24. BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 197 (1999).
25. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 (9th ed.
1996).
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rate of flow of electric charge from one place to another.26 As the
charged particles move within a circuit, electrical potential energy is
transferred from a source to a device in which that energy is stored or
converted into another form or work.27
When a conductor, such as copper or aluminum wire, is not ener-
gized by a generator and is at rest, negatively charged electrons in the
copper atoms are free to move randomly in all directions thermally in
the conductor, in close orbit around their nuclei, similar to molecules
in a gas moving in random motion. Because the motion of the elec-
trons is random, there is not a net flow of charge in any direction
inside the copper wire.28 Since there is no net flow of charge, there is
no current.29
This changes when an electric field is applied to the copper wire by
a power generation facility; with controlled moving charges becoming
current in a wire.30 In metal conductors, the moving charges are al-
ways negatively charged electrons; in an ionized gas or ionic solution,
the moving charges include both positively and negatively charged
ions.31 The copper atoms in the wire are comprised of electrons cir-
cling the protons and neutrons in the copper atom nucleus,32 in close
orbit when no electric generation is present.33 It is the movement of
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 800.
29. Id.
30. Id. The effect on the copper wire is that in addition to the random motion of
the charges within the conductor there is also a very slow motion of the moving
charges in the direction of the force of the electric field. This electric field does work
on the moving charges.
31. Id. at 808.
32. The electron is negatively charged at a value equal to the positive charge of
the proton. In a conductor, like copper, the electrons are weakly attracted to the atom
and are easily forced away to neighboring atoms. VAN VALKENBURGH NOOGER &
NEVILLE, INC., BASIC ELECTRICITY 1–7 (1992).
33. Unless the wire is conducting current, there are just as many electrons going
forward as backward in the wire, the electrons have frequent collisions with the other
electrons and with atoms in the wire, and they transport no charge. When current
flows through a wire to transmit power, there are slightly more electrons with veloci-
ties in the current direction than opposite it. There will be an average drift velocity
that is very much smaller than the Fermi velocity. Consider a typical American house-
hold circuit that can carry I=15 amps of current before blowing out a fuse. The diame-
ter of the wire is about 0.1 cm so its cross section is about A=0.0079 cm^2. The density
of electrons in copper is approximately N=8.5x10^(22) cm^(-3)) (one electron per
copper atom), and the electron charge is e-1.6x10^(-19) C. So one can find the drift
velocity from the formula I-eNvA, or v=I/(eNA) = 0.14 cm/sec. This is a miniscule
velocity compared to the random Fermi velocity. An electron moving at the drift ve-
locity would take more than three minutes to move one foot down the wire. At the
same time, the electric and magnetic fields that transmit the electrical power are mov-
ing down the wires at nearly the speed of light. The field velocity is slowed down
slightly by a few tenths of a percent by the “dielectric” effects of the electrical insula-
tion. Email from Dr. Will Happer, Professor, Princeton University Department of
Physics, to Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School (Apr. 24,
2003) (on file with author).
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copper electrons from copper atom to atom within the electrical field
that is electricity.34 Electricity is the potential difference in electrical
charge between two atoms.35 Their energy content is constant and re-
mains unchanged before, during, and after electricity is “generated.”36
For a conductor to have steady current, it must be in a closed loop.37
As the current flows through the circuit, the atoms in the metal wire
resist that flow and decrease the potential energy carried by the
charges.38 The influence that makes current flow from lower potential
to a higher potential is called electromotive force.39 The unit of elec-
tromotive force is the volt or a joule/coulomb.40 A device that pro-
vides an electromagnetic field (“EMF”),41 supplies additional energy
to increase the charge’s electric potential so that it can continue
around the closed loop repeatedly. There is the same amount of
charge at the beginning and at the end of the loop, at varying levels of
potential energy.42
In every building, the copper wires running through the walls con-
tain charges that are connected to the electric field in the electric dis-
tribution system owned by utilities.43 The electric company supplies
customers with a dynamic electric field, which induces the flow of
charge in the circuits in the building and to connected appliances.
While many attorneys and court decisions assume that the electric
utility company is selling its customers electrons, these electrons are
not consumed by the customer. Only the energy that they are carrying
is consumed by the end-user. For every moving electron that a cus-
34. The kinetic energy of moving electrons is mv^2/2, where m is the electron
mass. The changes in this kinetic energy are negligibly small compared to the changes
of energy associated with the creation or annihilation of electromagnetic-field energy.
Almost all of the electrical power is carried by the electric and magnetic fields that
race down the wires at nearly the speed of light. Id.
35. This potential difference is a “volt.”
36. The light and heat produced have exactly the same energy as has been trans-
ported into the device from the electromagnetic fields. The motion of the electrons in
transmission lines or appliances is of minor significance compared to the energy trans-
ported by the fields. Email from Dr. Will Happer, supra note 33.
37. VALKENBURGH NOOGER & NEVILLE, INC., supra note 32. When the electric
field is applied but there is no closed loop, a current begins to flow with the result of a
positive net charge at one end of the conductor and negative net charge at the other
end. Then these charges produce an electric field in opposite direction, canceling out
each other, and resulting in no net electric field and no current. With a closed circuit,
the current will continue to flow.
38. Id. When the charges return to their starting point, they are at a lower poten-
tial than they were previously at the start because of this resistance.
39. YOUNG & FREEDMAN, supra note 25, at 809.
40. A joule is a unit of energy. A coulomb is a unit of charge.
41. For a discussion of EMF, its effects, and resulting legal issues, see STEVEN
FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER §§ 8:24–8:27 (39th ed., 2014).
42. YOUNG & FREEDMAN, supra note 25, at 809. The charge is not lost or con-
sumed at any point in the circuit.
43. The rotation of a magnetic field around a conductor induces an electric field in
the copper wires.
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tomer’s wires receive from the electric company, the electric company
receives an electron back from the customer. The charge is never con-
sumed nor created, and it remains constant in time at the beginning
and at the end of any legal transaction.
The electricity in the world is transmitted principally via alternating
current, where the current changes direction of flow either 50 or 60
times per second.44 With alternating current, electrons do not flow
around a uni-directional circuit but instead oscillate in both directions
in a confined area of the copper conductor. It is the movement itself,
rather than the matter of the electron that is used by consumers.45 No
additional charges or electrons are created or consumed. What is con-
sumed by a consumer is the movement of intangible energy in an elec-
tric field acting to move the electrons already present in customer’s
electric circuits. What is delivered and sold is electric potential, an
electric field.
We measure this intangible as energy transferred per unit time. The
usual unit of energy is the kilowatt-hour (“kWh”). One kilowatt is
1,000 watts per second. A watt is a joule per second. So a kilowatt-
hour is 3,600,000 joules. One kWh is 1,000 watts for an hour.
B. Is an Electric Energy Field a Form of Tangible Property?
Natural gas can be stored efficiently, is traded in a nationwide mar-
ket as a commodity, and is governed by distinct and different law by
FERC pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.46 Unlike gas or oil, which are
tangible matter, electricity is an invisible wave or force. It is created
by the movement (not the consumption) of electrons, rather than the
sale and permanent transference of title to the electrons themselves.
Natural gas is matter that moves from fifteen to twenty-five miles per
hour.47 Electricity is “transmitted,” while natural gas is “transported.”
Electricity is not matter, but the energy by-product of the movement
of matter.
Matter, itself, can be a “good.” Even if electricity were considered
property, title and use of the moving property electrons is not sold; it
is used temporarily for a period of time, and the cost of the transac-
tion is measured, in part, by time of use. Use of something during
time, rather than a transfer of title or fee simple to the property, is a
lease.48 Leases of access for a period of time, unlike the physical sale
44. WORLD ELECTRICITY STANDARDS, supra note 23.
45. Id. at 850.
46. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. ch. 15B et seq. (2012).
47. Id.
48. Lease, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/lease [https://perma.cc/YK3A-429X] (“a contract by which one conveys
real estate, equipment, or facilities for a specified term and for a specified rent; also:
the act of such conveyance or the term for which it is made”).
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and consumption of other forms of energy such as natural gas or oil
molecules, typically are considered by the law as service transactions.
Telecommunications, another utility, travel in electromagnetic
waves through microwave transmissions which themselves travel
through space, over copper wire, or fiber-optic cable. Telecommunica-
tions, Internet use, and television broadcasts49 utilize the electromag-
netic spectrum, as does electricity, for the purpose of a sound and/or
video image. Electricity, television, Internet, and telecommunications
transactions do not involve the transfer of exclusive legal possession
of a tangible “good,” as do sales of oil or natural gas commodities.
There is no physical flow of a containable volume of matter when
electricity, the Internet, television, and telecommunications are in-
volved. The consumer is accessing a network. Therefore, despite su-
perficial similarities to fossil fuels, electricity has as much or more
factually in common with telecommunications, the Internet, and tele-
vision services.
It is well-settled that telecommunications is regarded as a service
and not a “good” or commodity.50 Similarly, audio and visual televi-
sion communications have been deemed to be a service rather than a
“good” or commodity.51 The fact that electricity is “sold” is not dis-
positive: Telephone service and cable television service, both indispu-
tably services under the law, also are sold and “distributed in discrete
quantities.”52 If telephone service quantities under court precedent
are denominated as “discrete,” then certainly electric quantities also
are “discrete.”
49. A television signal is an electromagnetic wave from an antenna transmitted
through space at the speed of light. The consumers’ antennae receive small amounts
of power (a few millionths of a watt). In an analog signal are binary integers of infor-
mation for transmission of picture and sound. Email from Dr. Will Happer, supra
note 33.
50. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding long distance telephone calls did not constitute “commercial activity” within
the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Daleure v. Kentucky, 269
F.3d 540, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding telephone services were not “goods” pursuant to
Robinson-Patman Act); Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 808 F. Supp.
1131, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding long distance voice communication services were
not commodities to which the Robinson-Patman Act applied but instead were
“services”).
51. See Rankin Cnty. Cablevision v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 692 F.
Supp. 691, 692–93 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that cable television service was not a
commodity); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Commc’ns Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1114
(S.D. Miss. 1976) (discussing the purchase and sale of television signal programming
and finding that no sale or purchase of any tangible commodity was involved for pur-
poses of Robinson-Patman Act, which “only relates to the sale of tangible commodi-
ties and not to services”). Many of these decisions occurred within the context of anti-
trust litigation. For discussion of anti-trust law, see supra Part VI.
52. City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982).
Telephone service is distributed and sold in quantities as discrete as one minute inter-
vals, while electricity is billed in no smaller than hourly intervals (as a kilowatt hour of
service).
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Whether a “good,” a product, or a service, electricity is the same
thing at every moment, not changing as it crosses state lines, enters
additional transactions, or causes additional injuries. It is exactly the
same unchanged item when confronted by any court in any state. In
fact, few “goods” in commerce are as consistently uniform as electric-
ity. Nonetheless, there are fundamental differences as to how courts
construe this unchanging electricity in different states, and within the
same state when the dispute involves contract, tort, anti-trust, or
bankruptcy law.
The determination of electricity as a “good” or a service can be out-
come-determinative in a legal dispute.53 First, we look at contract law:
How do states and federal agencies regard the millions of contracts for
the use of electricity? We start and end with legal confusion.
III. CONTRACT LAW: THE NEW ‘ART’ OF THE DEAL54
A. How the Factual Distinction Determines the Law and Outcome
Whether electricity is a good governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code (“U.C.C.”), or a service governed by the general state common
law, can alter the outcome of the legal dispute in more than a dozen
significant areas of contract law, because a different set of rules, with
substantively different principles, will apply.55
Twenty states, a significant fraction of U.S. states, have either par-
tially or entirely deregulated the sale of power.56 With deregulation,
private party contracts for sale replace much of traditional govern-
ment regulation in the power market. In this new environment, there
is a wide host of every kind of contractual dispute to resolve regarding
electricity.57 Contract disputes involving “goods” are resolved pursu-
ant to the statutory rules of the U.C.C., with particular regard to its
implied warranties of title to the “good” sold, fitness, and
merchantability of “goods.”58 Contractual disputes involving services
are not covered by the statutory provisions of the U.C.C. but are de-
termined pursuant to widely varying state common law. Table 1 sets
53. See infra Part III.
54. DONALD J. TRUMP & TONY SCHWARTZ, THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987).
55. See infra Table 1.
56. See supra Figure 1.
57. These include, e.g., production, sale, operation and maintenance arrange-
ments, power wheeling, trading of power, etc. In a deregulated power market, individ-
ual contracts will need to address a variety of factors: (1) how primary and back-up
power resources will be supplied; (2) the allowable loss, disruption, or variation in the
quality and quantity of electricity supplied; (3) the remedies and damages for failure
to supply; (4) specific force majeure provisions to relieve supply obligations, general
allocation of risk among various suppliers, transporters, intermediaries, and users of
power; (5) insurance provisions to support power supply obligations; and (6) agree-
ment on the standard of provision of electric power.
58. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). State
U.C.C. statutes generally are, with some variation, uniform from state to state.
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forth some primary distinctions between these two systems of contract
law.
TABLE 1: KEY DIFFERENT RULES BETWEEN THE U.C.C. AND THE
COMMON LAW
TraditionalIssue U.C.C.Common Law
1. Must acceptance of a contract offer
exactly or materially “mirror” the Yes No
terms of the offer?
2. In wholesale electric transactions, can
additional terms to the deal be added
No Yesby the acceptance, even if not
contained in the offer?
3. Must enforceable contracts for more
than $500 either be in writing or No Yes
evidenced by a writing?
4. Can an existing contract be modified
No Yeswithout new consideration?
5. Are prior oral statements includable
Less likely Possiblyas part of a written contract?
6. Can a contract be modified orally
even where that contract prevents Yes No
such modification?
7. Will indefinite gaps in a contract
usually be filled in and the contract Often not Usually
enforced?
8. Must a demand for assurances of
performance be in writing? Is
No Yesresponse always required in less than
thirty days?
9. Can a firm offer in writing not
supported by consideration be Yes No
revoked?
10. Is substantial performance of
obligations, rather than perfect Yes No
performance, allowed?
11. Are trade practices and past conduct
Often not Alwaysrelevant in interpreting the deal?
12. Is the market value of an item
measured at the time of breach rather
Yes Nothan at the time that the party was to
perform?
13. Will implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness be read No Yes
into the contract?
14. If the warranty/remedy fails, will
No Yescourts throw out quality disclaimers?
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B. Legal Definitions of “Goods” and Services
The U.C.C. definition of “goods” is:
(1) [A]ll things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, invest-
ment securities (Article 8) and things in action. . . .
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest
in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identi-
fied are “future” goods.59
1. Movement
The comments to the U.C.C. definition state that “[t]he definition
of goods is based on the concept of movability . . . .”60 The U.C.C.
does not “deal with things which are not fairly identifiable as mov-
ables before the contract is performed.”61 The U.C.C. notes that
“identifying” goods at some point prior to delivery is a distinction of
goods.62
Electrons cannot be identified and delivered in any sense that the
U.C.C. contemplates. Electrons are not visible, and while we know
that they are present in atoms, specific electrons cannot be identified
as the object of a future sale. Electrons move at almost the speed of
light, but specific electrons cannot be identified, and are not, delivered
to a destination or buyer. Electrons in interstate commerce cannot le-
gally be traced.63 A seller or producer cannot move or send identified
electrons to a particular purchaser or user. If not used within a na-
nosecond, it is lost as waste heat.64 It can be stopped or started in a
second.
An electric field is transmitted; it is not moved in wire conductors.
Those wires do not move, are not sold in an electric power transac-
tion, and do not change title. Electricity is similar to sound, which is
not deemed movable and is not deemed by courts a “good” to be gov-
erned by the U.C.C.65 Sound and power are things transferred
through a medium.
59. § 2-105.
60. § 2-105 cmt. 1.
61. Id.
62. See §§ 2-501, 2-613, 2-709.
63. See, e.g., New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002); Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 460 (1972).
64. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 568
(6th ed. 2013).
65. One transmits sound, like speech, through a medium of particles. Although a
medium is not always required for an electric field as it is in sound, it is very similar to
the transmission of sound.
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2. Tangible
The legal question for courts is whether the electric field that the
energy company provides its customers is a tangible, movable “good.”
For electricity to qualify as a “good” governed by the U.C.C., it needs
to be tangible and movable. That can be answered: “Movable” is le-
gally defined as “[p]roperty that can be moved or displaced, such as
personal goods.”66 Black’s Law Dictionary defines electricity as mova-
ble, but intangible rather than tangible. It specifically identifies elec-
tricity and light as examples of intangible movables or a “physical
thing that can be moved but that cannot be touched in the usual
sense.”67
Electricity has been found to be “tangible” for purposes of subject-
ing it to taxation,68 and legislation in several states defines electricity
as tangible.69 If electricity is considered an intangible, it cannot be a
good, pursuant to the U.C.C. Decisions in several other states declare
electricity to be intangible,70 and not subject to tax as a “good.”71
66. Movable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
67. Intangible Movable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). The definition
goes on to state “‘intangible movables’ is a term of art in the common law which has
been applied more widely than its meaning literally justifies, which is merely to those
things that have physical existence and can be moved, though cannot be touched in
the normal sense, such as light, electricity and radioactive waves.”
68. See Farrand Coal Co. v. Halpin, 140 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ill. 1957) (“The Retail-
ers’ Occupation Tax Act is, by its title, an act ‘in relation to a tax upon persons en-
gaged in the business of selling tangible personal property to purchasers for use or
consumption’ . . . . [T]he General Assembly when using the word tangible in referring
to personal property had in mind the ordinary and popularly understood meaning of
such term as indicated in Webster’s first definition thereof, which is ‘Capable of being
touched; also, perceptible to the touch; tactile; palpable . . . .’ From the evidence it
appears that although energy and mass are closely interrelated, indestructible,
equivalent, interchangeable, directly proportional to and may be equated with each
other, yet energy as such cannot be separated from mass or matter and stored,
weighed, transported, handled, liquified, solidified, photographed, touched or other-
wise perceived by the senses in its own right or capacity separate and apart from mass
or matter.” (citation omitted)).
69. Kansas’ statute states, for example, that “‘[p]roperty which is consumed’
means tangible personal property which is . . . used in the actual process of and imme-
diately consumed . . . or dissipated within one year.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3602
(West 2015). Electricity qualifies as such property. New Mexico defines tangible per-
sonal property to include electricity. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3 (1978). Arizona
states that, “‘[p]urchase’ means any transfer, exchange or barter, conditional or other-
wise, in any manner or by any means, of tangible personal property for a considera-
tion, including transactions by which the possession of property is transferred but the
seller retains the title as security for payment.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5151
(2013). Though not specifically deemed tangible property, Louisiana has not explicitly
excluded electricity or other utilities from its tangible property definition. See LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, § 4301 (2012).
70. See Miller v. City of L.A., 197 P. 342, 343 (Cal. 1921) (“Electricity is rather an
intangible asset, and the word ‘property’ is perhaps not the most apt word by which to
describe the supply of electrical energy thus sought to be acquired for the use of the
city.”); People v. Menagas, 11 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. 1937) (referring twice to electrical
energy as being intangible); N. States Power Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 6639,
2016] GOODS SERVICE CHAOS 595
Although people can feel electric current when they are shocked,
the electric company is not providing electric current but rather is sup-
plying the electric field to set that current in motion. So is this a ser-
vice, rather than a tangible good that can be moved? Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a service as “[t]he act of doing something useful for
a person or company for a fee”; “[a] person or a company whose busi-
ness is to do useful things for others”; “[a]n intangible commodity in
the form of human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.”72
C. Electricity = Good
Electricity may be a good technologically, but is it a “good” legally?
The most cited decision in this area is an Indiana appellate decision
holding that electricity is a “good.”73 Helvey brought an action for
breach of implied and express warranties for damage caused to his
110-volt appliances when the electric company furnished more elec-
tricity at 135 volts to his home.74 The incident had occurred over four
years before he filed suit.75 The statute of limitations for a contract
action in Indiana was four years while the statute of limitations for the
breach of a furnished service was six years.76 Therefore, Helvey ar-
gued electricity is a service, and the defendant electric company ar-
gued it was a good.
The court stated that it is “necessary for goods to be (1) a thing; (2)
existing; and (3) movable, with (2) and (3) existing simultaneously.”77
The court found electricity was movable because of “the monthly re-
minder from the electric company of how much current was passed
through the meter . . . whatever can be measured in order to establish
the price to be paid would be indicative of fulfilling both the existing
and movable requirements of goods.”78 The court held that electricity
was a good and that a four-year statute of limitations applied, barring
Helvey’s suit: “Logic would indicate that whatever can be measured in
order to establish the price to be paid would be indicative of fulfilling
both the existing and movable requirements of goods.”79 The court
1997 WL 66759, at *2 (Minn. Tax Ct. Feb. 14, 1997) (footnotes omitted) (“We are
convinced that electricity is not tangible personal property under the 1993
Definition.”).
71. See Corporate Franchise Hearings, Mins. of Cal. State Bd. of Equalization
(April 17, 2002), http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/041702.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z6EY-FENP] (explaining that electricity cannot be classified as tangible
personal property because it cannot be traced to a destination and cannot be stored
for future use).
72. Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
73. Helvey v. Wabash Cty. REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. App. 1972).
74. Id. at 609.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 609–10.
77. Id. at 610.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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held that the electricity, having passed through the consumer’s meter,
was a good and the four-year statute of limitations applied and barred
recovery.80
In Indiana, for example, two later appellate court decisions cite to
Helvey without further explanation as to whether electricity is a
“good” or service.81 The Court of Appeals of Indiana determined that
cable television signals were not tangible personal property but rather
a service.82 Relying on this, the Indiana Tax Court concluded that
electricity was not tangible personal property and not equivalent to a
“good” for taxes on goods.83 So there is inconsistency even within the
courts of a given state.84
A municipal court in Ohio found electricity to be a “good” when a
utility company brought an action against a consumer for breach of
80. Id. at 609–10.
81. Petroski v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Ind. App. 1976);
Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 396 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Ind. App. 1979). In Pe-
troski, a fourteen-year-old boy suffered serious injuries when he touched an electric
distribution line where he often played. The boy brought an action for negligence and
strict liability, arguing that the public utility was a manufacturer of a defective prod-
uct, it placed that product into the stream of commerce, and that he was in the zone of
foreseeable harm from such a defect (as required by § 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts). The court concluded that strict liability cannot be imposed on the
utility because the product was not placed into the stream of commerce. Petroski, 354
N.E.2d at 747. On appeal, the Petroski court relied on Helvey, holding that electricity
is a “product” under section 401A. Id.; see Helvey v. Wabash Cty. REMC, 278 N.E.2d
608, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). The Petroski court stated that “a literal ‘sale’ of goods is
not necessary for the application of § 402A.” Petroski, 354 N.E.2d at 747. The test is
only “whether the product has been placed in the stream of commerce. . . . [U]ntil the
electricity reaches its destination in a home or factory, it is transmitted by equipment
over lines under the exclusive control of [the utility].” Id. The utility transmission lines
“are not a part of the end product,” therefore, the utility “had not yet placed its
product in the stream of commerce” while the electricity was in the lines. Id.
82. Dep’t of State Revenue v. Cable Braz., Inc., 380 N.E.2d 555, 559–61 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978).
83. Mynsberge v. Dep’t of State Revenue, 716 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. T.C. 1999).
Richard Mynsberge leased buildings and equipment to Coppes, a manufacturer of
kitchen cabinets. Id. at 630–31. Under the lease agreement, Coppes made monthly
payments to Mynsberge in return for electricity. Id. at 631. Mynsberge paid a total of
$11,492.11 in gross retail (sales) tax on its purchases of electricity from NIPSCO dur-
ing the tax years at issue. Id. Mynsberge filed for a refund with the Department of
State Revenue for the sales tax it paid on the purchase of electricity; however, the
Department denied Mynsberge’s refund. Id. Mynsberge appealed this decision. Id.
Mynsberge argued that section 6-2.5-5-8 of the Indiana tax code provides that transac-
tions involving tangible personal property are exempt from state gross retail tax if the
person acquiring the property acquires it for resale, rental, or lease. Id. at 636. The
court held that Mynsberge’s purchase of electricity was a “retail transaction” subject
to gross retail tax. Id. at 638. The Tax Court of Indiana adopted the court’s reasoning
in Cable Brazil, holding that electricity purchased by Mynsberge was “not tangible
personal property” and thus, Mynsberge’s resale of electricity to Coppes did not
render Mynsberge’s purchase of electricity within the sales tax exemption.
84. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (explaining the California, Mas-
sachusetts, and Texas inconsistencies in determinations as to whether electricity is a
“good” or a service).
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contract in relation to gas and electricity supplied to a consumer, by
relying on Helvey and cases with similar reasoning.85 Helvey serves as
the foundation upon which much of the case law classifying electricity
as a “good” was built. The Helvey court held that electricity was mov-
able simply because customers are billed for the amount of energy
that they have used for the month. This is a controversial rationale.86
Long distance phone companies charge customers for the time spent
on the phone with long distance callers, but this is a service.87
Electrons cannot be individually identified or delivered.88 A seller
or producer of electricity cannot identify and segregate at the time a
contract is made a specific electron or stream of electrons and have it
move to a specified customer.89 Electricity is not movable like other
types of goods or products; it is a charge inside an unmovable wire
owned by the utility, and that wire is never transacted in a sale—it
delivers usable power.
In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding90 regarding Pacific Gas
and Electric Company (“PG&E”), but adjudging a contract law action
within the bankruptcy proceeding, a district court in California found
that electricity was a “good” and the U.C.C. applied to the contracts
at issue.91 Puget Sound Energy, Inc. and PG&E entered into contracts
to transmit power to and from each other.92 PG&E failed to perform
during the California electric energy crisis; Puget sued PG&E for
breach on March 20, 2001, and PG&E filed bankruptcy on April 6,
2001. The bankruptcy filing stayed the Puget contract action, and Pu-
get filed a motion for relief from the stay or, in the alternative, for
adequate assurance or protection.93 To determine whether adequate
assurances were required, the court had to first determine whether the
U.C.C. governed the transaction as the sale of a “good.”94
85. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713, 714–15 (Hamilton Cty.
Mun. Ct. 1986).
86. Just because something can be measured and one can be charged for it does
not mean that it is movable. Hourly workers are paid for their service as a function of
time. Just because one can be billed, their service is not a “good.”
87. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding long distance telephone calls did not constitute “commercial activity” within
the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Daleure v. Kentucky, 263
F.3d 540, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding telephone services were not “goods” pursuant to
Robinson-Patman Act); Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 808 F.
Supp. 1131, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding long distance voice communication ser-
vices were not commodities to which the Robinson-Patman Act applied but instead
were “services”).
88. See, e.g., New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002); Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 460 (1972).
89. U.C.C. § 2-613 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2014).
90. For more on bankruptcy actions, see Part V, infra.
91. Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.),
271 B.R. 626, 638–40 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
92. Id. at 629.
93. Id. at 633.
94. Id. at 638.
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The court relied on the noun in the agreement calling for the “ship-
ment” of electricity, a term often used for the transportation of goods,
to categorize electricity, as a U.C.C. “good.”95 Without any analysis of
what electricity actually is physically, the court cited a litany of
phrases from opinions implying that electricity is a “good” or a prod-
uct, and held, in part:
Simply put, electricity in this instance is a thing movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale. That is clearly demon-
strated by the fact that the Agreement calls for the shipment of spe-
cific quantities of electricity. The electricity is moved through power
lines and the amounts are metered and therefore identifiable. The
court will apply the U.C.C.96
D. Electricity = Service, Not a Sale of “Goods”
New York classifies electricity as a service.97 While removing a CB
antenna from his friend’s roof, James Farina died when the antenna
came into contact with the overhead power lines maintained by Niag-
ara Mohawk Power Corporation.98 The court determined that Niagara
was not liable for Farina’s death. Noting that “there is implicit sugges-
tion that electricity is a subtle agency that pervades all space and
evades successful definition,”99 the court concluded that electricity
was not intended to be within the definition of “goods” under the
U.C.C.,100 even though this also contained products liability claims.101
A Massachusetts court held electricity to be a service in New Bal-
ance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Boston Edison Co.,102 rejecting the reason-
ing in Helvey because of its sweeping negligence and breach of
warranty claims for a fire caused by a power surge, electricity was not
a “good.”103 The defendant, Boston Edison, argued that since public
95. Id. at 638–40.
96. Id. at 640.
97. See Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (App. Div.
1981).
98. Id. at 646.
99. Id. at 647.
100. Id. at 701. But see Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) (holding that electricity was not a service
where a boy accidently touched an aluminum tent pole to power lines, resulting in
serious injury), rev’d on other grounds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988) (“We agree with
the better reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions which hold electricity to be a prod-
uct.” Id. at 785.).
101. For more on tort actions, see Part IV, infra.
102. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996 WL
406673, *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996). A New Balance athletic shoe factory in
Boston was severely damaged by a fire caused by an electrical power surge emanating
from equipment owned and operated by Boston Edison Company. When New Bal-
ance asserted a claim for breach of the implied warranties under U.C.C. sections 2-
313 through 315, Boston Edison moved for, and the court granted, summary judgment
on the warranty claims.
103. Id. at *2.
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utilities were already heavily regulated, they should be outside the
scope of tort and contract law.104 The court agreed, finding that the
“decision to expose public utilities to liability for their ‘products’ is
best left in the capable hands of the legislative body that is charged
with regulating those utilities.”105
Michigan also defines electricity as a service and not a “good.”106 In
Buckeye Union Fire Insurance, the appellate court reversed on this
point, agreeing with the trial court that electricity is a service.107 Mary-
land courts also found electricity prior to its retail sale to be a service,
rather than a “good,”108 as did Ohio.109
In Navarro County Electric Cooperative v. Prince, the Reverend
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to sue a utility company for a viola-
tion of the U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability for the sale of
a “good.”110 The Texas appellate court held that the transmission of
electrical energy along high-voltage lines prior to the step-down trans-
former were not “goods.”111 The court reasoned that the legislature,
in passing the implied warranty statute, meant to confine its applica-
bility to tangible manufactured or produced products that normally
might be found in bulk quantity or in packaged goods.112 When apply-
ing those requirements to electric energy, the court found that elec-
tricity could not be classified as a fungible “good” nor could it be
adequately packaged or labeled.113 The court held that the sale of
electricity would more fittingly be termed the “rendition of a
service.”114
104. Id.
105. Id. at *3.
106. Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316, 316–17
(Mich. App. 1972). Buckeye, along with a building owner, brought a suit against the
Detroit Edison Company for negligence and breach of implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability regarding the electricity supplied by Edison.
107. Id. at 319. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the evidence they submitted against
the electricity supplier failed to establish that a fire in the house was caused by defect
in the manufacture or delivery of electricity.
108. The Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d
419, 420, 422 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
109. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d at 715.
110. Navarro Cty. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.—Waco
1982). The plaintiff lived in a mobile home beneath high voltage electrical transmis-
sion lines. The wires did not directly carry electricity into plaintiff’s home. While ad-
justing a television antenna beneath the wires, plaintiff received a shock, causing
injuries.
111. Id. at 400.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(b) (West 2003) (“Goods
to be merchantable must be at least such as (1) pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description; and (2) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair aver-
age quality within the description; and (3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used; and (4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (5)
are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
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A Maryland court determined that raw electricity did not constitute
a “good” under the Maryland U.C.C.115 Moreover, raw electricity still
within the utility’s distribution system was not deemed marketable.116
This high-voltage electricity, not yet converted into usable electricity,
“is not the refined product that the customer intends to buy.”117 Other
courts do not make voltage-related physical distinctions, but charac-
terize electricity, in general, as a service.118 In Farina v. Niagara Mo-
hawk Power Corp., New York refused to recognize electricity as a
good at any time during its production, delivery, or use.119 The New
York court, after deeming electricity a service, refused to enforce the
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.”). In Prince, the plaintiff used these requirements to claim that the electricity was
not fit for the purpose for which it was to be used. He also contended that the implied
warranty extended to the container of the product, the wiring, and that it was unfit for
transporting electricity. In support of these contentions, the plaintiff testified that the
current jumped from the transmission line to the antenna. Prince, 640 S.W.2d at 399.
115. See Singer Co. Link Stimulation Sys. Div. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d
419, 424 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). The Link Division of the Singer Company, a high
tech engineering firm that made training simulators for government and industry,
opened a manufacturing plant in Maryland. Id. at 422. Baltimore Gas & Electric
Company supplied the electricity to the manufacturing plant. Id. Singer’s business was
dependent on an uninterrupted supply of electricity because its simulators could not
run without it. Id. In addition, the heating, ventilation, and cooling systems in the
building were driven by electricity. Id. Singer experienced eight electrical power inter-
ruptions or outages and claimed that such interruptions violated the U.C.C. implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. Id. at 421.
116. Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
117. The Singer Co., 558 A.2d at 424 (internal citation omitted). This raw electricity
included electricity in the overhead cable transmission lines.
118. See Encogen Four Partners, LP v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914 F. Supp.
57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Encogen owned and operated a cogeneration facility in New
York. Id. at 58. Niagara Mohawk provides electric gas and power throughout a larger
portion of upstate New York. Id. Niagara entered into a power purchase agreement
with Encogen where Niagara agreed, as required by the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) and state statute, to purchase all electricity produced by
Encogen. Id. at 58–59. Niagara made payments for the electricity, but the payments
were below those amounts agreed in the power purchase agreement. Id. at 60. In a
similar case, Norcon, an independent power producer, entered into a power purchase
agreement with Niagara similar to the Encogen agreement. Norcon Power Partners v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153, 153–54 (2d Cir. 1998). In both cases,
Niagara requested adequate assurances of future performance from Encogen and
Norcon regarding their ability to continue to produce electricity. Encogen, 914 F.
Supp. at 60; Norcon, 163 F.3d at 156–57. Under New York law, the sale of electricity is
not a sale of “goods,” but rather a service. Encogen, 914 F. Supp. at 61. Thus, the
U.C.C. would not govern contracts such as the Encogen and Norcon electric power
purchase agreements. Id. The United States District Court in Encogen cited Farina as
a basis for its conclusions, but just as in Farina, the Encogen court did not state any
analysis that leads to its holding. Id.
119. Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (App. Div.
1981). Mr. Farina was killed when an antenna he was removing from the roof of his
home came in contact with an electrical wire owned by Niagara Mohawk Power Cor-
poration. The administratrix of Farina’s estate sued Mohawk in tort and for breach of
warranty.
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U.C.C.’s provision governing the right to demand adequate assurances
of future performance.120
E. Federal Administrative Law on Contract “Goods”: FERC
By applying U.C.C. principles without modification to adjudicated
power transactions, FERC is establishing that electricity is a “good.”
FERC adopted the U.C.C. rule uncritically without any analysis, and
in some cases appears to have done so contrary to a clear issue about
electric distribution services. This FERC position sprung to life appar-
ently without careful analysis of the comparisons or differences from a
policy, physical, or legal perspective.121 Because FERC regulates both
electricity and natural gas, which is a “good,” FERC reflexively as-
sumed that all energy is equal under the law, without being consistent
with state law.
1. FERC Equates Electricity with Gas, Contrary to Applicable
State Law
In Commonwealth Electric Co. v. Boston Edison Co.,122 FERC ap-
plied the U.C.C. course-of-performance rule without analyzing
whether (1) electricity was a good, (2) the U.C.C. applied, or (3)
which state’s version of the U.C.C. governed the case. Of note, Massa-
chusetts itself, as a matter of law, considers electricity not to be a
“good,” but to be a service.123 The federal agency contradicted the
state court determination on a matter exclusively of state law. And
this also contradicts FERC’s stated principle of wanting to apply Arti-
cle II of the U.C.C. because forty-nine of fifty states have adopted
it.124 Though all states but one have adopted identical provisions of
Article II of the U.C.C., this does not mean that a state applies it to
every contract, especially for things deemed to be services by the
state.
FERC mechanically applied U.C.C. course-of-performance rules re-
garding electricity sales. Village of Jackson Center involved an Ohio
contract dispute125 between Dayton Power & Light Company
120. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-609 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1989).
121. Telephone Interview with FERC staff member, FERC (May 2002). FERC
staff indicated that no analysis had been performed, no current staff could recall on
what basis electricity has been treated as a “good,” but that it was.
122. Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Bos. Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,253, at P 61,758
(1989).
123. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996 WL
406673 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
124. Telephone Interview with FERC staff member, supra note 121.
125. See Vill. of Jackson Ctr., 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,013, at P 65,123–24, 65,132 (2000). In
1994 the parties entered into a Power Service Agreement (PSA) with five different
rate schedules: firm power, short-term power, firm transmission service, short-term
transmission service, and regulation service. Id. A conflict developed over the fifth
rate schedule when Dayton Power & Light Co. allegedly overcharged for regulation
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(“DP&L”)126 and municipal utilities over rate schedules and costs of
purchased power.127 FERC again cited the generic unenacted model
U.C.C., adopted nowhere, as generally applicable contract law, rather
than specific state U.C.C. provisions, to support the validity of the
contract provisions.128
FERC applied the U.C.C. to open price terms, where the U.C.C.
rule differs significantly from the common law applied to service con-
tracts. In Central Illinois Public Service Company (“CIPSCO”), the
Commission applied section 2-305 of the U.C.C. to determine whether
a contract between CIPSCO and its wholesale customers was an open
price term contract.129 The Commission concluded that the contracts
were open price term contracts as defined by the U.C.C., and were
therefore valid and enforceable.130 Accordingly, FERC concluded
that the sale of electrical energy is directly analogous to the sale of
natural gas, and, therefore, within the purview of section 2-105(5) of
the U.C.C.: “Since the Uniform Commercial Code applies to natural
gas sales as the sale of goods . . . and all states except Louisiana have
adopted the U.C.C., variations between state law and general princi-
ples are likely to be few.”131 However, electricity is not analogous to
natural gas and is governed by different federal statutes, even if
FERC has administrative authority under both statutes.
In Arkansas Power & Light Company (“Arkansas Power”),132 the
Commission granted reconsideration of its order that had denied the
request of several Missouri cities to reject Arkansas Power’s rate filing
with the Commission.133 In applying federal law, the Commission ap-
plied precedent that specifically cited to the unenacted model version
service. Id. at 65,124. Some of the municipal utilities parties to the contract either paid
what they thought was a fair fee for service or did not pay at all. Id.
126. Id. at 65,123. Dayton Power & Light Co. (“DP&L”) is a public utility in Ohio
that serves residential, commercial, industrial, and government customers, and eleven
municipal corporations in Ohio including the village of Jackson Center. Id.
127. Id. at 65,124. The municipal customers filed the original complaint against
DP&L alleging that DP&L had breached the PSA’s pricing provisions. DP&L filed a
breach of contract suit in Ohio state court for failure to pay for services. See Vill. of
Jackson Ctr., 90 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,287, at P 61,756 (2000).
128. Id. at 65,132–33.
129. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,043, at P 61,091 (1982).
130. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1989). The U.C.C.,
which allows parties to conclude a contract without settling the price if they so intend,
modified “traditional” common law that considered price “agreements to agree” typi-
cally unenforceable and indefinite. If the parties fail to agree on the price, the U.C.C.
sets the “reasonable price” at the time of delivery. U.C.C. § 2-305.
131. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at P 61,091.
132. Ark. Power & Light Co., 20 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,013, at P 61,033 (1982).
133. Id. at 61,033–34. The Commission denied Missouri Cities’ motion to reject Ar-
kansas Power’s rate filing. Id. (involving “the Mobile-Sierra contract question”
doctrine).
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of the U.C.C., which did not have the effect of law, either in Missouri
or elsewhere.134
In Golden Spread Electric Cooperative,135 the Commission applied
the U.C.C. to determine the assignment of contract rights. The assign-
ment of property rights does not significantly vary between the U.C.C.
and general common law/services jurisprudence. Even though the un-
derlying contracts were contracts for service by a jurisdictional utility,
Southwestern Public Service Company (“SPS”), and within the Com-
mission’s jurisdiction, FERC elected to apply the U.C.C., which per-
tains only to goods.136 The Commission found no controlling federal
interest against applying “established law” to the assignment issue,137
which it concluded without analysis was Texas’s version of U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-210,138 consistent with its past practice of addressing contract
law questions.139 Despite objection from SPS,140 the Commission held
that the assignment of the cooperative’s full requirements agreements
with SPS was valid under both the U.C.C. analysis and Texas law.141
134. Id. at 61,034–35 (reconsidering its order dated March 3, 1982, pending a deci-
sion on the issue of Missouri Cities’ and Arkansas Power’s intent regarding the terms
of their contract, to determine whether the contract allowed unilateral rate changes).
135. Golden Spread Elec. Coop., 40 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,348 (1987).
136. See id. at P 62,047. The Commission has authority to regulate the terms and
conditions of electric rates and to determine that the assignment issue was “important
in relation to the regulatory responsibilities of the Commission.” Id. at P 62,045. In
support of its position, the Commission also held that to suspend its decision out of
deference to a Texas court decision would violate § 205 of the Federal Power Act,
which required the Commission to decide Golden Spread’s rate filing within sixty
days. See id. at P 62,047 (noting the Commission’s responsibilities under 16 U.S.C.
§ 824d (1982)).
137. Id. at P 62,047 (citing Pennzoil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 645 F.2d 360, 387 (5th Cir.
1981) (“[T]he appropriate law for the Commission to apply to a contract issue is, in
the absence of significant conflict between federal interests and the application of
state law, the law that would apply if the subject matter of the contract were
unregulated.”)).
138. See id. “Unless otherwise agreed, all rights of either seller or buyer can be
assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other
party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or
impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance.” Id. (quoting TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210 (West 1968)).
139. See id. (citing Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 20 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,043, at P 61,091 (1982)
(applying section 2-305 of the U.C.C. to a contract dispute)).
140. See id. at P 62,045. SPS had argued that under Texas law, contracts involving
extension of credit and long-standing personal relationships, as between SPS and the
cooperatives, were “exceptions to the general rule that contracts are assignable.” Id.
SPS sought a factual determination of whether the parties intended the agreement to
be assignable and whether Golden Spread would be able to perform as the coopera-
tives performed prior to the assignment. See id. at P 62,045–46.
141. Id. at P 62,048. The Commission held that the assignments were valid under
both the U.C.C. analysis and the analysis applied by the Texas courts. Id. The Com-
mission further held that full requirements agreements do not prohibit assignments
and the assignment would not materially alter SPS’s position. See id. The Commission
ordered that SPS would have the same obligation to provide the same service to
Golden Spread as it had for the cooperatives. Id.
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2. FERC Applies the U.C.C. to Transmission Services
Oddly, contrary to the U.C.C., FERC even applied the U.C.C. to
decide a contract issue involving transmission service, rather than the
sale of the electricity itself. Transmission service is typically under-
stood to be a service. In Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency
v. Northern States Power Co. (respectively, “Southern Minnesota” and
“Northern States”),142 Southern Minnesota143 filed a complaint alleg-
ing that Northern States144 had adopted new contract interpretations
and altered long-standing practices in relation to their three transmis-
sion contracts.145 The Commission applied the U.C.C.’s definition of
“course of performance” to the parties’ conduct, quoted the
unenacted model version of the U.C.C., and cited the corresponding
Minnesota provision.146 It thus applied the U.C.C. to a contract for
transmission services, utilizing a provision where the U.C.C. diverges
from the common-law rule for services.147
The Commission also determined that the STS transmission con-
tract was analogous to an “agreement to agree” where the parties
agreed to conclude a contract even if a price, or loss factor, was not
142. S. Minn. Mun. Power Agency v. N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,350
(1995); see also N. States Power Co., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,010 (1992) (initial decision); N.
States Power Co. v. S. Minn. Mun. Power Agency, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,350, at P 62,063
(1992).
143. “[Southern Minnesota] is a municipal corporation . . . of Minnesota, organized
in 1977 for the purpose of supplying electric power to its members. [It] consists of 18
member municipalities, each of which owns and operates an electric utility system in
Minnesota.” N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at P 62,064.
144. “[Northern States] is a public utility that . . . sells power and energy and oper-
ates a transmission system in parts of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota.”
Id. Northern States delivered power to Southern Minnesota under three contractual
agreements. Id. at P 62,063.
145. Id. at P 62,063, 62,065.
146. Id. at P 62,080; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-208(1) (2002) (repealed 2004);
U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1989). The Commission determined that both parties’ “course of
performance” modified the “initial” loss factor of 7% initially stated in the contract.
N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at P 62,080. In a footnote the Commission referred
to section 2-208(1) of the U.C.C.:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportu-
nity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning
of the agreement. . . . The U.C.C., including this provision, has been adopted
by Minnesota.
Id. at P 62,080 n.37 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-208(1) (repealed 2004)).
147. During the periods that the parties did not agree, the loss factor would remain
at the level that would be determined by their course of performance. Id. at P 62,080.
After May 1, 1986, and until 1992, the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to
the proper level of losses under the shared transmission system (“STS”) agreement,
and the level of losses was changed on two different occasions. Id. at P 62,066. On
May 1, 1986, the parties used losses of 4.5%, and on January 1, 1989, the parties used
losses of 4.2%. Id. The new loss factors were used without the STS Coordinating
Committee’s approval. Id.
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determined, and applied the U.C.C. to govern such matters.148 Here
again, the application of the U.C.C. rule changed the outcome: An
“agreement to agree” is enforceable under the U.C.C., but not typi-
cally enforceable in a services contract. Moreover, the application of
the U.C.C. allowed the court to insert “reasonable” prices even where
not settled by the parties. To determine a reasonable rate on which the
parties intended to agree, the Commission once again quoted from the
unenacted model version of the U.C.C. and cited the relevant Minne-
sota provision.149 The contract was enforceable under the U.C.C. but
perhaps would not have been enforceable under common law.150
FERC has also employed the U.C.C. to invoke “usage of trade” in
the interpretation of the performance of the parties. Seminole Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light (respectively, “Seminole”
and “FPL”) involved a contract dispute over indirect costs listed in the
parties’ Interconnection Agreement.151 The Commission agreed with
FPL that Seminole’s interpretation was inconsistent with the U.C.C.’s
usage of trade.152
F. Contract Conundrum
There is a conundrum regarding contracts and commerce within the
realm of electric power. Since virtually everyone and every business
purchases electricity, this becomes a significant legal issue affecting
148. See id. at P 62,080. “In this context, the contract in question can be considered
analogous to an ‘agreement to agree’ and is cognizable under section 2-305 of the
U.C.C.” Id. at P 62,080 n.39; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-305. FERC quoted Minne-
sota’s U.C.C. section 2-305, which provides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though
the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the
time for delivery if . . . (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and
they fail to agree . . . .
MINN. STAT. § 336.2-305 (2015); see N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at P 62,080 n.39
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 336.2-305).
149. See N. States Power Co., 73 F.E.R.C. at P 62,080 n.39.
150. See id. Although the Commission did not go through the same U.C.C. analysis
for the Outlet Agreements, its decisions were similar, and also based on its authority
to decide the rate factors. See id. at P 62,082, 62,084. The Commission fixed a loss
factor of 2.3% for the STS, Southern Minnesota, and UMMPA Outlet Agreements
effective as of the date of the order. Id. at P 62,084. The Commission applied the 2.3%
loss factor for the STS Agreement during the fifteen-month refund period from Au-
gust 25, 1991 through November 24, 1992. Id. at P 62,080. The loss factor would then
revert to the 3% contract loss factor until the date of the order, where the loss factor
would revert to the “just and reasonable” level of 2.3%. Id. at P 62,080–81. For the
Southern Minnesota and UMMPA Outlet Agreements, the Commission held that the
loss factors prior and subsequent to the August 25, 1991 fifteen-month refund period
were the contract loss factors, 3% and 1.2%, respectively. The loss factor during the
refund period and after the date of the order was 2.3%. Id. at P 62,084.
151. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,026, at P
61,098 (1990).
152. See id. at P 61,100, 61,104; see also U.C.C. § 1-205 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 1989). FPL asserts that at the time of their agreement, indirect costs were
regarded as standard utility costs that were routinely covered by utilities.
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everyone. The states are split on whether electricity is a “good” or a
service. There is a reason that forty-nine states have adopted Article
II of the U.C.C. in almost identical form—so that there is a relatively
uniform set of rules for the sale of “goods.”153 However, adopting the
U.C.C. does not mean that services are covered as if they were
“goods” under the U.C.C.
In more than a half-dozen cases, FERC has applied the U.C.C. un-
critically to resolve disputes regarding the course of performance,
trade usage, open price terms, parol evidence, assignment of contract,
and transmission rights.154 This has often resulted in a significantly dif-
ferent decision than under the general common law applicable to ser-
vices in the states. This difference could determine the outcome of the
case, which creates precedent. In some decisions, FERC, a federal
agency,155 contradicted state court determinations on exclusively state
law matters of contract law,156 which further contradicts FERC’s
stated principle of wanting to apply Article II of the U.C.C. because
forty-nine of fifty states have adopted it.157 Nevertheless, having
adopted it does not mean that one always applies it—it only applies to
contracts for “goods,” not contracts for services. This FERC position
evolved apparently without careful analysis of the comparisons or dif-
ferences from a policy, physical, or legal perspective.158
The FERC decisions that electricity is a “good” under the U.C.C.
were made, according to FERC personnel, in order to make it simple
by treating electricity in the same legal manner that FERC treats nat-
ural gas and to adopt a consistent state law, the U.C.C.159 And in the
interest of uniformity, FERC has even taken something fairly univer-
sally regarded as an electric service—transmission and distribution of
electricity over the power lines—and declared that that too is a
“good.”160 While convenient for decision makers, this avoids the core
question of whether the thing itself, electricity, is a tangible, existing
“good,” or the service of delivering into a house a unified electric
field. While in physics there is a mathematical relationship between
energy and mass (E = mc2), legally, there is a difference between tan-
gible “goods” and intangible services.
153. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LOCATOR, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uni-
form/ucc#a2 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
154. See supra Section III.D.
155. Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Bos. Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,253, at P
61,756.
156. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-53221-E, 1996 WL
406673 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
157. Telephone Interview with FERC staff member, supra note 121.
158. Id. FERC staff indicated that no analysis had been performed, no current staff
could recall on what basis electricity has been treated as a “good,” but that it was
convenience.
159. Id.
160. See supra Section III.E.
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The electric commodity is completely standardized as to uniform
system frequency, voltage, ancillary services, and other key physical
characteristics by the requirements of the integrated grid operator or
the distribution utility.161 And despite several states making a distinc-
tion that electricity magically undergoes a transformative change in
the electricity itself when at the point it is measured at a retail
meter,162 this does not comport with the physical reality. Only a few
court decisions seem to carefully analyze where and what metering
does when deciding that metering transforms a service to a “good.”
There is not a distinction as to what electricity is, depending on the
voltage in a particular line, or whether it has been metered once,
twice, or more times.
Although the states may slightly favor that electricity is a service,
this is always evolving. Even consistency within states is not present.
For example, Massachusetts has determined that electricity is a service
rather than a “good” in contract disputes163; yet in bankruptcy law
matters, it has determined that electricity is a “commodity” rather
than a service.164 Notwithstanding this, FERC has determined that
Massachusetts electricity in contract law matters is a “good.”165 The
same electricity cannot be both “good”/commodity and a service, si-
multaneously, under the law.
IV. TORT AND INJURY
In tort law, strict liability can be imposed under state precedent on
all manufacturers or distributors of defective or inherently dangerous
products.166 In the products liability arena, in order to be subject to
strict liability, electricity must be a product. A product is not a service
to which strict liability for the supplier applies in tort law. A plaintiff
bringing a strict products liability action need not prove negligence,
recklessness, or intention to harm by the manufacturer or distributor
of the product, thus facing a lower legal burden of proof.167
Strict products liability applies to an entity that “sells any product in
a defective condition [which renders the product] unreasonably dan-
gerous” and causes injuries.168 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a prod-
161. See FERREY, supra note 41, at §§ 10:81–10:84.
162. See supra Section III.C.
163. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-53221-E, 1996 WL
406673, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
164. In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
165. New Balance, 1996 WL 406673, at *3.
166. To invoke strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the plaintiff must prove he or she purchased the product from someone en-
gaged in the business of selling the product, the product was defective, the product
caused harm to the plaintiff or his or her possessions, and the manufacturer or distrib-
utor put the product into the stream of commerce. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
167. See id.
168. Id.
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uct as “[s]omething that is distributed commercially for use or
consumption and that is usu[ally] (1) tangible personal property, (2)
the result of fabrication or processing, and (3) an item that has passed
through a chain of commercial distribution before ultimate use or con-
sumption.”169 The electric field which is supplied is not a tangible
product.
A. Electricity: Not a Product
The Ohio Supreme Court determined that electricity was not a
product in Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (“DP&L”).170 The Ottes
sued DP&L for damage to their dairy operation as a result of stray
voltage released onto their property.171 In order to succeed on their
products liability claim, the court had to characterize electricity as a
product. The court defined a product as anything made by human in-
dustry or art.172 The court held that electricity did not fit within that
definition because “electricity is the flow of electrically charged parti-
cles along a conductor.”173 The charged particles are not manufac-
tured by DP&L, “but rather, [DP&L] sets in motion the necessary
elements that allow the flow of electricity.”174 Such a system that al-
lows for the flow of charged particles is a service.175
The court called the court of appeals’ holding that electricity was a
product an “attempt[ ] to equate the process of creating and delivering
electricity to the manufacturing and sale of an ordinary consumer
product . . . an intellectual disaster.”176 Furthermore, consumers “do
not pay for individual electrically charged particles . . . . [T]hey pay for
each kilowatt hour provided . . . . [C]onsumers are charged for the
length of time electricity flows through their electrical systems. They
are not paying for individual products but for the privilege of using
DP&L’s service.”177
In G & K Dairy v. Princeton Electric Plant Board,178 the court
found that a municipal electric board that received electricity from the
169. Product, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011).
170. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio 1988).
171. Id. at 837. The plaintiffs bought a dairy farm and operated it for several years.
Id. at 836. Milk production declined by 25%, one-half of the cows contracted udder
infections, and the cows were acting strangely, at the same time that stray neutral-to-
earth voltage had been released onto their property. Id. at 836. The plaintiffs sued the
utility for negligence, breach of contract, and strict liability. Id.
172. Id. at 838.
173. Id. (“Electricity appears to fall outside this definition . . . . because electricity is
the flow of electrically charged particles along a conductor. . . . [The defendant did]
not manufacture electrically charged particles, but rather, set[ ] in motion the neces-




177. Id. at 839.
178. G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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Tennessee Valley Authority did not manufacture the product within
the meaning of the strict liability doctrine.179 The court held that
under Kentucky law, “strict products liability . . . is unavailable against
one who renders a service as opposed to one who manufactures or
supplies a ‘product.”’180 The court found that because Princeton Elec-
tric Plant Board did not generate electricity, but rather received it and
distributed it to its customers, it provided a service and products liabil-
ity could not be applied.181
The opinion in Otte actually seeks to understand the nature of elec-
tricity before issuing its opinion that electricity is a service.182 In Ran-
some v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.,183 which is often cited for the
proposition that electricity is a product rather than a service, instead
of analyzing what electricity is, the court states that it “need not be
concerned with . . . [the] accurate descriptions” of electricity.184 While
the distribution of electricity may be a service, the actual electricity in
ordinary consumer use is a consumable product.185
B. Electricity as a Product Creating Strict Liability
In 1979, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that electricity is a
product. In this determination, the court gave the following cursory
analysis on the nature of electricity.
While there probably are numerous technical definitions of “elec-
tricity,” we need not be concerned with those accurate descriptions
here—suffice it to say it is a form of energy that can be made or
produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed
to be used as an energy source for heat, power and light and is dis-
tributed in the stream of commerce. The distribution might well be
179. Id. at 489. Kentucky had adopted the strict liability doctrine of the Restate-
ment Second of Torts, and applied section 402A to the claim that G & K Dairy’s cattle
were injured by stray electricity.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court placed much weight on the term “service,” which was used “con-
sistently” by the Kentucky Public Service Commission’s regulations in reference to
the furnishing of electricity. Id.
182. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ohio 1988).
183. Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Wis. 1979). The plain-
tiff brought an action against the defendant on a product liability theory claiming that
at the time the electricity left the defendant’s control, it was unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at 648–49. The defendant claimed that the lightning was an act of God and a
superseding intervening cause of the fire. Id. at 649. The trial court stated that the sale
of electricity occurs at the meter and may be considered a service, but the electricity
itself is a consumable product. Id. at 643. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed. Id.
at 648. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines “defective condi-
tion” as any “condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM.
LAW INST. 1965).
184. Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 643. Electricity caused the injuries leading to a strict
products liability suit, rather than the fact of its distribution. Id. at 649.
185. Id. at 643.
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a service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordi-
nary user, is a consumable product.186
In Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., an Illinois
appellate court also held that electricity was a product. The court re-
jected the argument that because electricity is intangible, it is not a
product within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.187 The court held:
Having in mind that electrical energy is artificially manufactured,
can be measured, bought and sold, changed in quantity or quality,
delivered wherever desired and has been held by our supreme court
to be personal property whose unlawful asportation is larceny, we
are of the opinion that it is a product within the meaning of section
402A.188
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that electricity was a “product”
within the meaning of the state’s strict liability statute.189 The supreme
court stated that “electricity has been deemed a product for strict lia-
bility purposes not merely because it can be produced, confined, con-
trolled, transmitted, and distributed, . . . but also because it ‘is
artificially manufactured, can be measured, bought and sold, changed
in quantity or quality, delivered wherever desired, and [is subject to]
larceny.’”190 Georgia courts consider the relinquishment of control
over the electricity and its marketability as key factors to be consid-
ered as to when it becomes a product.191
186. Id.
187. Elgin Airport Inn, Inc., v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 N.E.2d 620, 623–34
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 432 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. 1982) (citing
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “§ 402A Special Liability of
Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in
Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”).
188. Elgin, 410 N.E.2d at 624.
189. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 471 S.E.2d 854, 855–56 (Ga. 1996).
The decedent was towing a shrimp boat when a metal stanchion on the boat came into
contact with an overhead power line. When the decedent stepped onto the dock, the
electricity grounded through his body, the fuses did not blow, and he was killed. Id. at
855.
190. Id. (quoting Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 643). The court affirmed the appellate
court decision, which held that electricity is a product, but because the electricity had
not passed through the meter, there was no sale as required by the statute. Id.
191. See Zepp v. Mayor of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). Plaintiff
rural residents appealed an order that awarded summary judgment in favor of defend-
ants, mayor, and city council in an action disputing the rates charged for water that
plaintiffs purchased from the city. See id. at 674–75 (“In this regard we adopt the
reasoning of the Helvey v. Wabash Cty. REMC, . . . court: ‘Logic would indicate that
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A California appellate court, when it found that electricity was a
product, even noted that other courts addressing the issue of catego-
rizing electricity “ha[d] not dwelled unduly on electricity’s physical
properties.”192 The failures of numerous courts to address the techni-
cal characteristics of electricity are the norm, rather than the excep-
tion.193 In this case, the plaintiff was injured by a fall as the result of
electrical shock and brought suit alleging negligence and strict liability
for defective products.194
The court relied on Ransome and Petroski v. Northern Indiana Pub-
lic Service Co. in support of its finding that electricity was a “prod-
uct.”195 The defendant argued that electricity “is a force, like the wind,
with the potential to do work.”196 Addressing whether electricity must
be a “good” for contract law purposes if it is a “product” for tort law
purposes, without extensive analysis, the court stated that if electricity
is a “product” for purposes of strict liability, it assumed that electricity
is a “good” for purposes of the U.C.C., and the plaintiff could have
brought a successful implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose
claim under the U.C.C. in conjunction with its strict liability claim in
tort.197
The California court reasoned that “[e]lectricity is a commodity
which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported and sold,”
and as such, can only be classified as a product.198 Interestingly, hav-
ing used physical characteristics to justify its decision, the court did
not go further to identify which specific properties of electricity con-
stitute something being a product.199 Relying on public policy reasons,
the California appellate court in Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
stated that it did not definitively depend on definitional arguments to
whatever can be measured in order to establish the price to be paid would be indica-
tive of fulfilling both the existing and movable requirements of goods.’” Id. at 677–78.
192. Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 285. Lightning struck several utility company transformers, causing the
plaintiff’s home to lose electricity. The utility company came to the plaintiff’s property
and replaced the transformers, but did not test the replacement transformers before
installing them. One of the new transformers exploded causing a rupture in the gas
line located on the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff went to shut off the propane gas
and received a serious shock from the propane gas tank’s shutoff valve. The shock
tightened her hand around the valve, which prevented her from letting it go. Ten to
twenty seconds later, the plaintiff fell onto the propane tank, the electricity blew her
hand off the valve, and she tumbled away from the tank and down a six-foot embank-
ment. Id.
195. Id. at 289–90. The court defined “product” as any object or possession of in-
trinsic value, capable of delivery, and produced for introduction into trade or com-
merce. Id. at 288 n.4.
196. Id. at 288 n.3.
197. Id. at 293–94.
198. Id. at 290.
199. Id.
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determine whether electricity constituted a product or a service,
including200:
• to provide a shortcut to liability where negligence may be pre-
sent but is difficult to prove;
• to provide an economic incentive for improved product safety;
• to induce the reallocation of resources toward safer products;
and
• to spread the risk of loss among all who use the products.
C. Metered Electricity: Does Measurement Change the Electric
Field?
Some courts have drawn a distinction between metered electricity
as a good, and non-metered electricity as a service. There is no physi-
cal difference between either metered or non-metered electricity. The
only difference is whether the measurement results in a transaction.
There are millions of transactions every day for both services and
goods. For both contract and tort law claims, some courts have used
this to say that electricity becomes a product once it is measured and
sold, which occurs when it passes through the consumer meter.201
1. Metering Under a Contract
Regarding contract law claims, a municipal court in Ohio held that
electricity in its so-called “raw” state should be distinguished from
“metered amounts passing through utility owned conduits and into the
homes of consumers. The latter-described form of electricity is goods
as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.”202 The court reaches
this conclusion by listing precedents from several other states and
then stating its outcome without explaining other reasoning.
An Indiana court held that metered electricity sold to a consumer at
retail consumer voltage passing through the retail meter is a “good”
covered by the U.C.C.203 The court reasoned, as distinguished in
Helvey, that retail metered electricity was a “good,” while “raw” elec-
tricity was not a “good.”204 The court held that metered electricity
stepped-down to consumer voltage and sold to the homes of consum-
ers is a “good” under the U.C.C., while raw electrical energy encoun-
tered in “an unmarketable and unmarketed state” in the overhead
200. Id. at 291; cf. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio
1988) (rejecting any public-policy minded justification for the imposition of strict
products liability because they lack legitimacy in a highly regulated environment); see
also Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (App. Div. 1992)
(discussing a healthy tree falling on several power lines, causing abnormally high volt-
age to pass into the plaintiff’s house and dismissing the case).
201. For discussion of contract law claims, see Part III, supra.
202. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 503 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1986).
203. Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 396 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
204. Id. at 936.
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transmission cable was not.205 The court further reasoned that “[t]he
high-voltage electricity with which the Hedges came into contact was
not the good that [the power company] was intending to sell or the
Hedges were intending to buy.”206
In Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. (“BG&E”), Singer
filed suit against BG&E, asserting breach of contract and warranty
claims when Singer experienced power interruptions and outages that
shut down the simulations its computers were running.207 Singer
claimed that the electricity BG&E agreed to provide comprised
“goods” as defined in the Maryland U.C.C.208 The court found no re-
ported decision that held electricity to be a “good” while it remained
in a utility company’s distribution system.209 Since Singer’s claims
were based on an allegation of defects in an underground feeder, a
part of the BG&E distribution system that failed to allow electricity to
pass through the meter, the electricity at issue was still in BG&E’s
distribution system.210 The court found that “raw high voltage electric-
ity contained in a utility company’s distribution system because it has
not yet been converted into a useable state of lower voltage by passing
through a meter into a customer’s home or place of business, is not
the refined product that the customer intends to buy.”211 Thus, elec-
tricity remaining in the utility company’s distribution system is not a
“good” within Title 2 of Maryland’s U.C.C. and is not subject to
U.C.C. implied warranties.212
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Goebel, the dispute involved a
breach of contract action over unpaid bills for the sale of gas and elec-
tricity.213 The court was most convinced by reasoning that distin-
guished electricity in its “raw” form from metered amounts passing
through utility-owned conduits and into the homes of consumers.214
The court held that once electricity passes through the meter and into
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. The Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d
419, 421–22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
208. Id. at 423.




213. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713, 714 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1986). Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. brought an action alleging breach of contract. At
that time however, no case law existed in Ohio that was on point. Consequently, the
Hamilton County Municipal Court looked to other states’ decisions concerning the
issue. See id.
214. Id. at 715. The court, however, after determining electricity did constitute a
good under the U.C.C., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be-
cause Ohio’s U.C.C. contained a four-year statute of limitations, and plaintiff failed to
commence its action within four years. Id.
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the home of the consumer, it becomes a “good” as defined by the
U.C.C.215
2. Injury and Metering
Regarding tort claims, in Kentucky, a court found that “electricity is
subject to product liability rules only after it is ‘sold’ to the con-
sumer.”216 Sawmill owners had brought suit against an electricity util-
ity seeking to recover damages sustained in connection with a fire
caused by a series of voltage surges.217 It found that electricity is sold
when it passes through the customer’s meter because “it is at [that]
moment that the customer’s charges are computed, the seller relin-
quishes control over its product, and the electricity has been reduced
to a voltage suitable for ordinary use.”218 The court found that ordi-
nary electricity is a product, and electricity is sold and first becomes
subject to strict liability when it passes through a customer’s meter.219
In Bamberger & Feibleman v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.
(“IP&L”), the plaintiff’s attorneys asserted that IP&L was liable
under the Indiana Product Liability Act for economic losses arising
from the interruption of electrical service at a law firm.220 The court
found that electricity can be a “product” but must be in a marketable
and marketed state when the injury is incurred, as well as when placed
into the stream of commerce once it “reaches its destination in a home
or factory.”221
California courts also consider whether the electricity had been me-
tered.222 They determined that while still in the distribution system,
electricity is a service, not a product, until it passes through the cus-
tomer’s meter and into the stream of commerce.223 These cases all
215. See id. at 714–15.
216. C.G. Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 350
(W.D. Ky. 1994).
217. Id. at 348.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 352.
220. Bamberger & Feibleman v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 665 N.E.2d 933
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
221. Id. at 937.
222. See Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300, 306 (Ct. App. 1991).
223. Id. at 307. The Court of Appeals held that the sale and delivery of electricity
was the sale and delivery of a “product” for strict liability purposes once it is deliv-
ered. Id. at 308. The plaintiff owned and operated a furniture shop to which electric
service was provided by the defendant utility. Id. at 302. Lightning struck a trans-
former causing the transformer to explode, causing one of the meters in the plaintiff’s
shop to explode resulting in a fire that destroyed the premises and its contents. Id.
The plaintiff sued the defendant on negligence and strict liability theories. Id. at 303.
The Mancuso court cited Pierce and Ransome in support of its holding that electricity
is a product within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A strict
liability. Id. at 305–10. The court based its holding on language from Pierce that found
that electricity is a commodity and language from Ransome, which found that electric-
ity itself, in contemplation of the ordinary user, is a consumable product. Id. at 307.
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agree with the Helvey definition of electricity, but limit it to only elec-
tricity that has actually been sold to the customer.
D. Tort Tension
As with contract law,224 state law is split as to whether electricity is
a product or a service. A majority of courts, at least eight, have deter-
mined certain electricity to be a product, including California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wisconsin.225 This allows consumers to assert claims for strict product
liability. At least three other states, Kentucky,226 New York,227 and
Ohio,228 deem electricity to be a service in terms of the law.
224. See supra Section III.F.
225. The courts that have labeled electricity a product “have been consistent in
holding that the electricity must have been placed into the stream of commerce before
§ 402A strict liability can attach.” Schriner v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128,
1133–34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“[I]f electricity ‘in a defective condition, unreasonably
dangerous’ passes through the meter of a user or consumer and into the stream of
commerce, causing physical harm . . . , the doctrine of strict liability in tort may be
applied against the public utility . . . .”); see Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734
P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo. 1987) (“[A]t least until the electricity reaches a point where it
is made available for consumer use, it is not a ‘product’ that has been ‘sold’ or other-
wise ‘placed in the stream of commerce’ for the purpose of strict products liability
under § 402A.”); Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Wis. 1979)
(holding power company strictly liable for damage caused by electricity traveling
through the utility’s lines into the plaintiff’s house at a voltage between 1000 and 4000
volts). The point at which electricity enters the stream of commerce, losing its charac-
ter as a service and assuming that of a product, has been subject to dispute. Some
jurisdictions consider electricity to have left the utility’s control only after it has
passed through the customer’s electric meter, the point where the customer’s charges
are generally computed. See Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300, 308
(Ct. App. 1991) (“Electricity has been deemed to enter the stream of commerce when
it leaves the transmission lines and passes through the consumer’s meter.”); Curtiss v.
Ne. Utils., No. CV92-0511572-S, 1994 WL 702690, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)
(“[A]s a practical and legal matter the acceptance of electricity as a product has been
very rare. The concept of strict liability for the use or misuse of electricity has not
found a solid home in the area of product liability case law. . . . [E]lectricity is not a
‘product’ . . . .”); Pub. Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986) (“Electricity is considered to be placed into the stream of commerce when it
reaches its destination in a home or factory.”); Hills v. Ozark Border Elec., 710
S.W.2d 338, 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Prewitt, C.J., concurring) (“[The majority did]
not decide if strict liability in tort applies to sellers of electricity placed into the
‘stream of commerce,’ but the opinion reviews causation as if strict liability does ap-
ply.”); Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 842 (Ohio 1988) (“[S]trict
liability in tort for damages caused by [stray voltage] is not a cause of action that may
be asserted against a public utility.”); Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc., 469
N.W.2d 595, 601 (Wis. 1991) (noting that the lower court held that stray voltage is not
a product).
226. G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485, 489–90 (W.D. Ky.
1991).
227. Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (App. Div.
1992).
228. Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838.
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As with contract law,229 a significant number of states also conclude
that electricity is transformed into a product at the point it is metered
and enters the consumer’s building.230 However, the physical thing
that is electricity is no different before and after metering. Here again,
there can be different positions in decisions of courts within the same
state. For example, Kentucky courts have held that electricity is a ser-
vice and not a product in tort actions, and it becomes a product once it
is metered and enters a consumer’s building.231 The meter measures
the thing that electricity is—it does not change the thing.
V. BANKRUPTCY
May a creditor seek a preferred award of administrative expenses
under the Bankruptcy Code for its sale of electricity to a now-insol-
vent debtor? The code provides a payment hierarchy:
(b) After notice and hearing, there shall be allowed administrative
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this
title, including—
(9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20
days before the date of commencement of a case under this
title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of such debtor’s business.232
Courts are divided here too: Some conclude that because electricity
is movable and identifiable at the time of contract formation, it is a
“good,” and as such a creditor may seek to recoup monies owed under
§ 503(b)(9) on a preferred basis.233 Other courts hold that electricity is
a “service,” that it does not satisfy the definition of “goods” pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Code, and, therefore, should not be subject to a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy.234 Here again, there is inconsistent
treatment in different states on the answer to the fundamental factual
question of what electricity is. Some of the states reach a different
conclusion in bankruptcy matters than they reach on the same ques-
tion in contract, tort, or anti-trust matters, even though electricity is a
constant factual component.
A. “Goods”
In a bankruptcy proceeding, a district court in California found that
electricity was a “good” and the U.C.C. applied to the contracts at
issue.235 This was explained as more of a conclusion, without legal or
technical analysis of what electricity physically is:
229. See supra Section IV.C.1.
230. See supra Section IV.C.2.
231. G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 503f(b)(9) (2014).
233. In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Mass. 2010).
234. In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
235. In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 271 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
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Simply put, electricity in this instance is a thing movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale. That is clearly demon-
strated by the fact that the Agreement calls for the shipment of spe-
cific quantities of electricity. The electricity is moved through the
power lines and the amounts are metered and therefore identifiable.
The court will apply the U.C.C.236
In a Massachusetts bankruptcy court decision, In Re Erving Indus-
tries, the court held that the Massachusetts creditor’s § 503(b)(9) claim
related to the sale of electricity was entitled to be treated as preferred
administrative expenses as a sale of a “good.”237 Debtor asserted that
whether or not the court determined electricity itself to be a “good,”
NewEnergy was a service provider under regulatory definitions estab-
lished by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environ-
mental Affairs (“MEOEEA”)238 and under the “predominant factor”
test, negating any § 503(b)(9) claim.239
The court held that the “predominant factor” test did not apply to
the statute creating priority administrative expense claims for the
value of “goods” received by Debtor in the ordinary course of busi-
ness during the twenty days prior to the commencement of bank-
ruptcy.240 The court held that electricity constituted a “good” within
the meaning of the bankruptcy statute, finding persuasive
NewEnergy’s argument that it was a “competitive supplier,” which
bought electricity from generators for the purpose of selling it through
the deregulated market.241 The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code
236. Id. at 640.
237. In re Erving Indus., 432 B.R. at 354.
238. Id. at 357. The court reasoned that the description of the industry provided on
MEOEEA’s website was meant to educate the general public and that it did not “pur-
port to reach any conclusive legal characterization relevant to the industry.” Id. at
362.
239. Id. at 375.
240. Id. NewEnergy argued that the “predominant factor” test was irrelevant as to
a claim under § 503(b)(9), which created a priority claim for the value of any “goods”
sold to a debtor in the ordinary course of business within the twenty days preceding
the commencement of bankruptcy and did not impose a condition precedent that a
contract must be primarily for the sale of “goods” in order to raise a § 503(b)(9)
claim. Id. The court agreed with NewEnergy’s reasoning that the customer was ulti-
mately responsible to contract with the local utility for ensuring that the electricity
was delivered to the customer’s location. Id. at 362. The court held that the transac-
tions did not involve the rendering of services and therefore the test was inapplicable.
Id. at 372. The court further emphasized that even if part of what was delivered could
be deemed a service, the “predominant factor” test would be irrelevant to the deter-
mination of the value of goods received by the debtor within the meaning of
§ 503(b)(9). Id.
241. NewEnergy made several arguments as to why it was not a service provider:
(1) it did not perform the traditional service functions associated with electric utilities;
(2) it neither generated nor transmitted electric energy, and it was only a competitive
supplier in a deregulated market; (3) the state did not list it as a “utility provider” on
the Chart of Massachusetts Electric Utility Providers; and (4) referencing Black’s Law
Dictionary, “because [NewEnergy] [did] not have a monopoly or exclusive service or
franchise area, [was] not regulated by the government, and [was] subject to competi-
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does not define “utility,” but suggested that the term has come to be
understood as:
[A] business organization (as an electric company) performing a
public service and subject to special governmental regulations, that
has some special position with respect to the debtor, and has a mo-
nopoly in the area so that the debtor cannot easily obtain compara-
ble service from another.242
Because NewEnergy was not subject to governmental regulation,
and because it did not provide transmission, distribution, or customer
services in Massachusetts, it was not deemed to be a “utility.”243 As to
the nature of electricity, the court found:
We begin with the most basic concept, the idea that “all things are
made of atoms—little particles that move around in perpetual mo-
tion.” These atoms, in turn, are comprised of “a nucleus that has a
positive electrical charge . . . together with a number of electrons, all
having the same negative charge and mass, which move at distances
from the nucleus.” Electrons moving around the nucleus on the out-
ermost plane (or “shell”) can be knocked out of orbit and move
from one atom to another, taking their charge with them. It is the
energy produced by this movement of electrons from atom to atom
that we call “electricity.”
Power plants use these basic principles to create electricity by ap-
plying a force to push electrons out of their orbits and cause them to
“flow” from atom to atom. For example, the force of a spinning
electromagnetic rotor will move electrons out of orbit in a nearby
copper wire. This creates the electricity and electrical currents that
move through various transmission and distribution lines and are
ultimately diverted to homes and business where the electricity is
put to use.244
The court addressed whether electricity was tangible as “goods.”245
Debtor claimed that electricity had no actual physical form or attrib-
utes,246 relying on the court’s reasoning in Pilgrim’s Pride, “[that]
UCC § 2-105 does not suggest that the provision’s drafters had in-
tended that ‘goods’ would include things which cannot be pack-
aged.”247 However, the Erving court ultimately agreed with Creditor’s
reasoning: “[A]lthough its ultimate nature may be mystifying to most,
electricity is tangible and does possess physical properties. It is not
simply an ‘idea’ akin to intellectual property. Although perhaps lack-
tion from a number of available alternative sources of electricity [it was not a utility
provider].” Id. at 358; see also id. at 361.
242. Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id. at 364. The fact that MEOEEA did not list NewEnergy as a utility regu-
lated by the state supported the court’s conclusion that NewEnergy’s claim arose
solely from the sale of electricity and not from services provided. Id.
244. Id. at 367.
245. Id. at 367–78.
246. Id. at 368.
247. In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
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ing in corporeal shape and not easily observed, electricity really is
some thing, something that can be felt (although we are loathe to) and
something that can be created, measured and stored.”248
The bankruptcy court addressed issues regarding whether electricity
was movable and identifiable at the time of contracting, and con-
cluded that electricity was movable through the grid to the cus-
tomer.249 The court concluded that “[c]ourts have generally held that
electricity is identifiable because it can be measured at the point it
passes through the meter” and that “[the] process may occur at speeds
so imperceptible that consumption appears to occur simultaneous
with identification, but logic compels the conclusion that the electric-
ity is moving (and remains in motion) until it reaches the product
sought to be electrified.”250
In GFI Wisconsin, Inc. v. Reedsburg Utility Commission (In re
Grede Foundries), the district court, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
award of preferred administrative expense claims made by Reedsburg
Utility Commission and another power company for their sale of elec-
tricity to GFI Wisconsin within twenty days of its commencement of
bankruptcy.251 Debtor claimed that electricity was not a “good” pur-
suant to § 503(b)(9) because electricity was not movable and identifi-
able at the time of the contract of sale and could not be reclaimed or
replevied by the creditor.252 Relying on Erving Industries, the court
found electricity to be a “good,” movable when it entered the meter
and moved to debtor’s facilities, regardless of whether it can be re-
claimed,253 finding the movement virtually instantaneous and suffi-
cient to satisfy the definition of “goods.”254 The court determined that
the physical nature of electricity is complex:
[Electricity] requires an understanding of the nature of electrons
and a grasp of quantum physics and special relativity. For the pur-
pose of determining administrative priority under the Bankruptcy
Code, the meaning of “goods” under the UCC should not depend
on quantum physics, how fast electrons are moving at a particular
248. In re Erving Indus., 432 B.R. at 369.
249. Id. Debtor argued that electricity ceased to move at the time it was identified
in the contract for sale (measured by the meter) because identification and consump-
tion occur simultaneously. Id. at 370.
250. Id. (citing In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 271 B.R. 626, 640 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2002)).
251. GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm’n, 440 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2010).
252. Id.
253. Id. The district court noted that to constitute goods under § 503(b)(9), the
thing at issue must be identifiable, movable, have value, and be received by the debtor
during the 20-day period preceding the petition date. Id. at 798. Both the parties
agreed that the electricity Creditors sold to Debtor had been identified at the time of
contract because it had been metered, but disputed its movability. Id. The district
court rejected Debtor’s argument noting that section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code
does not require that goods must be reclaimable to fall under § 503(b)(9). Id. at 802.
254. Id. at 799.
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time or even where a debtor’s meter is located on an electrical cir-
cuit. Rather, determining whether a particular thing qualifies as a
good and deserves administrative priority should be a straightfor-
ward assessment, taking into consideration the nature and common
understanding of the thing, but also considering its similarities to
goods that fall undisputedly under the UCC and would receive ad-
ministrative priority under § 503(b)(9).255
The district court noted that every bankruptcy court that had con-
sidered the issue had applied the U.C.C. definition of “goods” in
U.C.C. section 2-105, and because forty-nine states had adopted some
version of the U.C.C., no additional definition was necessary.256 This
argument that one should use a U.C.C. definition because one exists,
even if the U.C.C. does not apply to transactions for services alleged
to be at issue, mirrors the logic of convenience of FERC in applying
the U.C.C. to indisputable transmission services.257
B. Services
In In re Pilgrim’s Pride, the debtor argued that electricity was not a
“good” in a § 503(b)(9) claim for electricity sold during the twenty
days immediately preceding the commencement of bankruptcy.258 Be-
cause the Bankruptcy Code does not define meaning of the term
“goods”—even though its appears throughout the code, the court uti-
lized the U.C.C.’s Article 2 definition of “goods” for the purpose of
“goods” under § 503(b)(9):
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action. “Goods” also includes the
unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified
things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).259
The court tracked precedent that electricity is property, but not all
property is “goods,” noting intellectual property as property that is
not “goods.”260 The court did not find persuasive Black’s Law Dic-
255. Id. at 799–800.
256. Id. at 797. The district court noted that Debtor did not plead the “predominate
factor” test initially and that it only addressed it in its reply brief before the bank-
ruptcy court, and thus had waived it. Id. at 804.
257. See supra Section III.E.
258. In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
259. Id. at 237. The majority of courts, both those that have concluded electricity to
be “goods” and those that have ruled it to be “services,” discuss the definition found
in Article 2. See, e.g., In re Erving Indus., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Mass. 2010)
(holding that electricity is “goods” once it is metered); contra, In re Samaritan All.,
LLC, No. 07-50725, 2008 WL 2520107 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 20, 2008).
260. In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. at 238 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (“electric energy thus produced, constitute[s] property”)).
The Court reasoned that Congress has the authority to dispose of electricity gener-
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tionary definition of a “product” in a modern economy.261 The court
noted that while electricity is metered, it does not automatically follow
that it falls within the U.C.C. definition of “goods.” While telecommu-
nication companies meter phone calls and bandwidths in a similar
manner as electricity providers, the former are considered “services”
and not “goods.”262 Decisions holding the contrary were not persua-
sive,263 and if the drafters of the U.C.C. intended that “goods” include
things that cannot be packaged and handled, they would have so
noted, contrary to the existing plain meaning of the U.C.C. and the
Bankruptcy Code.264
In In re Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., the creditor, Hudson En-
ergy Services, LLC appealed a decision of the bankruptcy court deny-
ing its request for administrative priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(9).265 Pacific Tea objected to Hudson’s motion claiming that
electricity did not constitute “goods” under § 503(b)(9).266 The bank-
ruptcy court in the initial trial denied Hudson’s motion, agreeing in
part with Pacific Tea that electricity did not fall within the definition
of “goods” in § 503(b)(9).267 The court considered In re Pilgrim’s
ated by a government owned dam, because electricity is property and Article 4, Sec-
tion 3 of the Constitution authorizes Congress dispose of property if it chooses. Id.
Not all property may be deemed to be “goods”—“one can have property rights in
trademarks, patents, and copyrights, but no one would argue that intellectual prop-
erty falls under the UCC definition of ‘goods.’” Id.
261. Id. at 238–39. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “product” as something dis-
tributed commercially for use or consumption. Many products that satisfy this defini-
tion would not qualify as “goods” under the U.C.C., such as television, explaining that
a broadcast is something that is commercially distributed and consumed by the view-
ing public, but does not fall within the meaning of “goods” because it is intellectual
property.
262. Id. at 239. The court further noted that metering and consumption of electric-
ity takes place simultaneously and as such there is no possibility of returning electric-
ity to the provider. Id. This would seem to suggest that “goods” needs to be subject to
replevy.
263. Id. (citing In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 271 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002)
(stressing that once electricity passes through a customer’s meter, it can be measured
and is in the stream of commerce)).
264. Id.
265. In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 498 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). Hudson
filed a motion to replevy $875,943.90 worth of electricity that it sold to Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea within twenty days prior to the commencement of Pacific Tea’s bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 21.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 19, 21 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547
U.S. 651 (2006), for the proposition that administrative expense claims “must be
tightly construed . . . and clearly fit within the statute’s provisions” before the court
can entertain any such claim). The bankruptcy court noted how other courts had in-
terpreted “goods” within the context of § 503(b)(9) claims, acknowledging that the
majority of courts dealing with § 503(b)(9) claims consider the U.C.C. definition of
“goods” to be sufficient to inform their decisions, but as to the sale of electricity, the
court thought otherwise, pursuant to the definition of “goods” under U.C.C. Article 2,
and the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act.
622 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
Pride Corp.,268 In re Grede Foundries,269 and In re Erving Industries,
Inc.,270 two of three of which determined that electricity is a “good”
rather than a service, and rejected the argument that when state law
considers electricity to be a service, state law should govern.271 The
court concluded that § 503(b)(9) requires a uniform bankruptcy analy-
sis to apply nationwide, citing In re Erving Indusries, Inc., which had
found electricity to be a service:
The Court remains mindful, however, that § 503(b)(9) is federal law
. . . . [T]o the extent that differences arise from local enactments of
the UCC or the variances in its interpretation by the courts of the
states, . . . federal bankruptcy courts should be reluctant to give
those variances effect under federal law.272
In its appeal, Hudson argued that the bankruptcy court erred in
finding that electricity was not a “good” for purposes of
§ 503(b)(9).273 On appeal, the district court found that the wide usage
and acceptance of “goods” as found in the U.C.C. was sufficient,274
and electricity did not fall within either U.C.C. section 2-105(1) (a
thing “which is movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract”)275 or section 2-105(4) (“an identified bulk of fungible
goods”).276 The court found that electricity was neither movable at the
268. In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that
electricity is not a “good” for purposes of § 503(b)(9) claims and therefore denying
creditor’s petition for administrative priority).
269. GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm’n, 440 B.R. 791, 799 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2010) (“[T]he bankruptcy court ruled correctly that electricity is a ‘good’ within
the meaning of Section 503(b)(9) of the Code.”).
270. In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354, 374 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (“Having
determined that the only question is whether electricity, as supplied by [claimant], is a
good under § 503(b)(9), this Court concludes that, using either the UCC definition or
the definition urged the Debtor, electricity easily falls within the definition.”).
271. Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153,
155 (2d. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he UCC does not apply to the sale of electricity which is a
service under New York law.”).
272. In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 498 B.R. at 22 (citing In re Erving Indus., Inc.,
432 B.R. at 366 n.23).
273. Id. at 24.
274. Id. at 25. The court noted that it would either review the bankruptcy court’s
findings of fact for clear error or review its legal conclusions de novo, and since an
administrative expense was a question of law, either standard of review would yield
similar outcome. The court ultimately determined that the bankruptcy court’s inter-
pretation of the U.C.C. definition of goods was valid. Id. at 24–25.
275. Id. at 26, 28. Hudson argued that electricity was moveable at two distinct
points: When Hudson purchased it and then released it into the grid, and when it was
measured as it exited the grid and passed through the customer’s meter. Id. at 26.
Hudson further explained that its purchase of electricity from power generators was
readily identifiable to its contract with Pacific Tea—thus satisfying the identification
requirement of Article 2-105(1). As to movability, Hudson contended that electricity
did not disappear the moment it passed through a meter, and was consumed when it
passed through a device. Hudson further argued that the precise moment of identifi-
cation and consumption was imperceptible, but the distinction existed nonetheless. Id.
276. Id. at 26, 28. Hudson argued that electricity did qualify as “identified bulk
fungible goods,” analogizing electricity to oil in a pipeline or grain in an elevator, with
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time of identification to the contract nor an identified fungible bulk of
goods; the order of the bankruptcy court was vacated and re-
manded.277 Having relied more on precedent finding that electricity is
a “good,” nonetheless, the court found electricity to be a service.278
In In re PMC Marketing Corp., Puerto Rico Electric Power Author-
ity (“PREPA”) filed a motion for pre-petition administrative expenses
pursuant to § 503(b)(9) in response to PMC Marketing Corporation
filing for bankruptcy.279 The bankruptcy court denied PREPA’s mo-
tion, holding that the utility provided a “service” rather than a “good”
and was not entitled to pre-petition priority expenses.280 The court
simply relied on the fact that PREPA, as a utility company, provides
“services.”281 The court distinguished the facts from those of In re Er-
ving Industries,282 because PREPA was not an alternative energy
seller, but is a traditional utility, noting that PREPA’s web page de-
fined itself as such: “PREPA produces, transmits and distributes, prac-
tically, all the electric power used in Puerto Rico.”283 Thus, the
bankruptcy court held that electricity did not constitute “goods” for
purposes of § 503(b)(9) because PREPA is a utility providing electric-
ity services.
one unit of electricity no different than another with the electricity it purchased ex-
isting as an “undivided” part of the whole power grid. Id. at 26. In response, Pacific
Tea argued that it is irrelevant if electricity is identifiable when it enters the power
grid because Hudson made no argument that electricity it sold to Pacific Tea was
identified to a contract for sale at the moment it entered the grid, once electricity was
identified at the meter and simultaneously consumed, it was no longer moveable, and
it is unreasonable to consider the entire power grid as “bulk” of goods, given that
electricity is continually generated, transmitted, and consumed and not a stable source
of electricity capable of identification. Id. at 27–28.
277. Id. at 28–29, 31. Hudson argued that Pacific Tea’s assertions on which the
bankruptcy court relied in concluding that electricity disappears at the moment it en-
ters the meter, and that electricity can only be identified at the point of delivery to the
customer, did not provide the district court with a clear path for determining whether
electricity was a good. Id. at 28.
278. Id. at 22.
279. In re PMC Mktg. Corp., 501 B.R. 17, 19 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013), vacated and
remanded, 517 B.R. 386 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014). PREPA claimed that twenty days
before the commencement of debtor’s bankruptcy, PREPA sold debtor electricity
whose total value amounted to $154,023.52, of which $89,336.42 remained uncollected
after debtor’s surety paid a prepetition bond secured by PREPA for debtor’s obliga-
tions. Id. PREPA asserted that the electricity that it sold Debtor constituted “goods”
under U.C.C. Article 2-105(1) because electricity is moveable and identifiable at the
time it passed through debtor’s meters, and it was entitled to administrative expenses
under § 503(b)(9). Id.
280. Id. at 24. PREPA is a utility because it is subject to government regulation as
are traditional utilities, and it has a monopoly and is a government-owned corporation
of Puerto Rico. Id.
281. Id. at 23.
282. In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
283. In re PMC Mktg. Corp., 501 B.R. at 23 (emphasis omitted). The court cited the
definition of “utility” in Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2001): “The
term ‘utility’ is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but its ordinary meaning is ‘a
service (such as light, power, or water) provided by a public utility.” Id. at 24.
624 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
Westfield Gas & Electric Light Department, a municipal utility,
sought administrative expense treatment for both electricity and natu-
ral gas that it sold to NE Opco, Inc. immediately prior to the cus-
tomer’s bankruptcy filing.284 The bankruptcy court concluded that the
“predominant purpose” test285 was not necessary for deciding whether
to grant administrative expenses:
[T]here is nothing in § 503(b)(9) that requires . . . . [the predomi-
nant purpose] approach for the purposes of that section of the
Bankruptcy Code. If a particular transaction provides for both a sale
of goods and a sale of services, and the value of each of them can be
ascertained, why shouldn’t the value of the goods be entitled to the
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense priority and the value of the ser-
vices be relegated to an unsecured non-priority claim? There may
well be sound policy reasons for not distinguishing between the sale
of goods and the sale of services to a debtor within 20 days before
bankruptcy, but that is just what § 503(b)(9) does. . . . The only rele-
vant determination under § 503(b)(9) is the value of the “goods”
that were delivered, irrespective of whether the contract also called
for the delivery and sale of services. The predominant purpose test
does not inform the Court as to whether a particular thing that has
been sold is or is not “goods.” Therefore, the predominant purpose
test is unnecessary. There is nothing in § 503(b)(9) that dictates the
use of a “winner take all” approach.286
In reconciling the inconsistency among other bankruptcy courts re-
garding whether electricity was a “good” or service under § 503(b)(9),
applying U.C.C. section 2-105 for its definition of “goods,”287 the
284. In re NE Opco, Inc., 501 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
285. Debtor urged the court to apply the apportionment test; Westfield urged use
of the predominant purpose test. Id. at 257. In the “predominant purpose” test, courts
look to the overall transaction between debtor and creditor to determine whether
“goods” or “services” predominate in the contract. Courts consider each component
of a bill issued by creditor to debtor, in an item-by-item analysis. Id.
286. Id. (citing In re Plastech Engineered Prod., Inc., 397 B.R. 828, 837 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2008)).
287. Id. at 241. The bankruptcy court discussed in depth the systematic approach
used by the court in In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010)
(“[E]lectricity is moveable, tangible and consumable, that it has physical properties,
that it is bought and sold in the marketplace and thus, that it qualifies as a good for
purposes of the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code. . . . [E]lectricity begins flowing
through power lines when a circuit is formed and continues moving at least until it is
metered. The metering satisfies the identification requirement of the UCC and the
movement is sufficient to satisfy the movability requirement, even if it reaches the
speed of light.”); GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm’n, 440 B.R. 791 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 2010) (“Taking into consideration the physical properties of electricity as
noted by appellant’s expert and the bankruptcy court, including the fact that electric-
ity is movable, and the parties agreement under which the energy usage and consump-
tion were determined by meter readings, [concluded] that electricity is a good under
the [U.C.C.] definition and also under the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 498 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (The court indicated that the
nature of electricity is not sufficiently uniform to support a rule applicable in all
cases.); In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding
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court noted that the courts in those cases considered one or more of
the following factors288:
• “Is electricity moveable at the time it is identified by passing
through the meter or is it consumed simultaneously with identi-
fication?”289 “Electricity cannot be shoehorned into the defini-
tion of a good . . . . Thus, under the plain meaning of section
503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, electricity is not moveable at
identification and, thus, is not a good because there is not a
meaningful delay between identification and consumption.”290
• “Is electricity ‘comparable’ with other things that are goods
under the U.C.C.?”291 “While water and natural gas stored in a
tank are still water and natural gas, electricity stored in a battery
is no longer electricity. It has become potential energy stored in
materials or chemicals that will produce electricity when they
react with each other. While the battery itself is a good, the elec-
tricity used to charge it and that will flow from it is not.”292
• “Does section 546(c) governing reclamation of goods control
whether electricity is a good or a service?”293 “As the statute is
written, section 546(c) establishes a narrowly tailored in rem
remedy for reclamation of goods sold to the debtor that is sub-
ject to a number of contingencies and defenses. . . . While certain
goods are subject to reclamation, other non-reclaimable goods
are also entitled to an administrative expense claim. Thus, sec-
tion 546(c) is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether
electricity is a good under section 503(b)(9).”294
• “Does section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code governing ‘utility
services’ control whether electricity is a good or service?”295 A
utility provider may provide both “goods” and services within
the meaning of both § 503(b)(9) and § 366, but the former is not
dependent on the latter for purposes of remedy under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, nor vice versa.296
• “Should the nature of the parties’ relationship, e.g., is the claim-
ant acting as a ‘public utility,’ determine whether electricity is a
good or service?”297 “If one makes the good/service determina-
that narrowly defining “good” so as not to include electricity for purposes of
§ 503(b)(9) is consistent with public policy under the Bankruptcy Code and that elec-
tricity is not a good).
288. In re NE Opco, Inc., 501 B.R. at 249.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 251.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 252. Batteries do not store electric power, rather they store chemical
energy that can be readily converted to electric power.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 254–55.
295. Id. at 255.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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tion based on the parties’ relationship, then the electric current
could travel from origination to use, starting as a good and end-
ing as a service. Indeed, since section 366 is unique to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, whether the wholesaler providing electricity to the
consumer is delivering a good or a service might depend on
whether the consumer is in bankruptcy. The problems with this
approach are self evident. The proper course is to determine
whether electricity, in and of itself, is a good.”298
• “Should section 503(b)(9) be strictly construed because it pro-
vides an otherwise unsecured creditor with an administrative ex-
pense claim and, if so, to what extent?”299 “The Court disagrees
that section 503(b)(9) should be strictly construed. Neither
should it be loosely construed. The court should simply apply
the law as written and not put a judicially created obstacle in the
path of an administrative expense claimant.”300
The bankruptcy court thereon held that electricity was not a “good”
under § 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, but that the natural gas
provided by Westfield to the debtor-customer was a “good” because
the U.C.C. specifically includes natural gas as a good in section 2-
107(1): “A contract for the sale of minerals or the like (including oil
and gas) . . . is a contract for the sale of goods within this Article if
they are to be severed by the seller . . . .”301
Having concluded that natural gas constituted “goods” under
U.C.C. section 2-107(1), the bankruptcy court directed that it be de-
termined which portions of Westfield’s combined gas and electric bill
applied to natural gas and to grant those expenses under
§ 503(b)(9).302 This precedent makes a key distinction between elec-
tricity as a service and natural gas as a “good.” This rigorous analysis
is apparently what FERC did not undertake to date at the federal
level.303
C. Bankruptcy Restart
There is even less reason for variation in treatment of electricity
under bankruptcy law than under state law. Bankruptcy law is federal
law, so there is not variation in fifty states, and one would expect a
consistent pattern of decision as to what electricity is. However, as
with contract and tort law, bankruptcy law is not uniform on whether
electricity is a “good” or a service. Cited above are five decisions find-
298. Id. at 255–56.
299. Id. at 256.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 256–57. As a result of this finding, the court ruled that Westfield’s
§ 503(b)(9) claim was valid as it referred to natural gas. Id. at 257.
302. Id. at 257–58.
303. See supra Section III.D.
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ing electricity to be a service and two decisions finding electricity to be
a “good.”
In these decisions, there does appear to be a reasonable consensus
that the definition of “goods” in the U.C.C. is appropriate to use to
define the undefined term “goods” in the Bankruptcy Code. Having
merged on a specified uniform statutory definition in the statute, the
courts could not agree on the conclusion as to whether electricity is a
“good” or a service.
And here too, there are more examples of state inconsistency as to
what electricity is, a discrepancy that further depends on the legal
claim in question. For example, in different Massachusetts matters:
• A bankruptcy court treated electricity as a “good.”304
• In contract law, Massachusetts treats electricity as a service
rather than a “good.”305
• FERC treats electricity as a “good” in Massachusetts contract
matters, despite the contrary state determination.306
• In anti-trust matters, electricity is deemed to be a commodity.307
In completely reversed alignment to Massachusetts, in bankruptcy
in a Texas matter, electricity is determined to be a service rather than
a “good,”308 while in contract law, Texas determines that electricity is
a “good” rather than a service.309 So there remains confusion and in-
consistency in how electricity is perceived in state and federal
adjudications.
VI. ELECTRICITY AND ANTI-TRUST LAW
A. Federal Acts
The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts only apply to commodi-
ties. Therefore, the application of these acts to the electrical energy
industry depends on whether the court classifies electricity as a com-
modity or a service.310 For anti-trust legal claims, the Clayton Act and
its revision under the Robinson-Patman Act, statutorily provide defi-
nitions of what is and is not subject to anti-trust actions: “It shall be
304. See In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
305. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996 WL
406673 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
306. Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Bos. Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,253 (1989).
307. Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mass. 1988).
308. See In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231, 235, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
309. See Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761, 765–66 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev’d on other grounds,” 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988)
(“We agree with the better reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions which held elec-
tricity to be a product.” Id. at 785.).
310. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 305 (2003). The importance of this classification lies in the Congressional
purpose in enacting the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act was a reaction by Congress to
the 1911 Supreme Court opinion in Standard Oil, which hold that only unreasonable
restraints upon trade violated the Sherman Act. Id.
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unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and qual-
ity. . . .”311 A section of the Clayton Act “makes it unlawful for
anyone engaged in interstate commerce to discriminate in price, ‘be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality’
when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly.”312
Therefore, the application of the Robinson-Patman Act would only
apply to electricity if it is a commodity in commerce. A commodity is
“[a]n article of trade or commerce. The term embraces only tangible
goods, such as products and merchandise, as distinguished from ser-
vices.”313 Again as with the “product” definition in tort law, it is un-
clear whether or not the electric field provided by the electric
company is tangible or a “good.” Arguably, electricity is neither tangi-
ble nor movable because it is transmitted rather than transported.
B. Electricity is not a Commodity or Manufactured “Good”
A U.S. district court in Delaware held in City of Newark v.
Delmarva Power & Light Co. that electricity was not a commodity
under the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.314
The plaintiff in the suit was a municipal corporation that owned and
operated electric distribution systems and purchased all of its power
from the defendants.315 The plaintiff alleged that Delmarva, among
other things, had substantially lessened competition in violation of
section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.316 The parties agreed that the term
“‘commodities’ refers to tangible articles of commerce.”317
The court noted that the term “commodities” is used in the Clayton
Act “in the context of items of ‘like grade and qualities’ and as synon-
ymous with ‘goods, wares or merchandise.’ These terms are not com-
monly applied to electric power.”318 The court also explained that the
Clayton Act reflected a concern about price discrimination with re-
spect to manufactured products and consumer goods.319 Since there
was a FERC regulatory structure in place and prevalent state energy
311. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
312. City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 772 (D. Del.
1979).
313. Commodity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
314. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. at 777.
315. Id. at 765.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 772–73.
318. Id. at 774.
319. Id.
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regulation, the court found it unlikely that Congress intended electric
utility rates to be subject to the Robinson-Patman Act.320
C. Electricity as a Commodity
Conversely, a Massachusetts district court held that electricity was a
commodity.321 The municipal corporation plaintiffs sued Boston
Edison, who supplied 95% of its power requirements.322 The plaintiffs
alleged that Boston Edison had violated the Robinson-Patman Act by
unlawfully charging them a higher wholesale price for electricity than
it charged to retail customers.323 Since the Act’s prohibition only ap-
plies to commodities, the plaintiffs’ claim was dependent on whether
electricity was a commodity.324
This court defined a commodity as “goods, merchandise, wares,
supplies and other items bought and sold in the marketplace.”325 The
court did not include services in the definition even if tangible prod-
ucts are transferred incidentally as part of the provision of services:
Electricity “lacks [the] typical characteristic[s] of items traditionally
placed” in the category of “goods.”326 Even though not clearly a tangi-
ble item,327 “[l]ike the more traditional commodities, electrical energy
is a thing bought and sold in the market place. It may be measured,
stored and even stolen.”328
The court held that electricity, although not obviously tangible, is
not completely intangible as it can be felt or touched: “The manufac-
ture and sale of electricity is no more a service than the manufacture
and sale of widgets.”329 In City of Kirkwood v. Union Electric Co., the
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that because
“[e]lectric power can be felt, if not touched . . . produced, sold, stored
in small quantities, transmitted, and distributed in discrete quantities,”
it is therefore a commodity subject to the Robinson-Patman Act.330
320. Id. One year prior to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress had
amended the Federal Power Act to provide for review of rates.
321. Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Mass. 1988).





327. Id. at 398.
328. Id. The Eighth Circuit, in another price discrimination lawsuit, held that elec-
tricity is a commodity because it can be “felt, if not touched. It is produced, sold,
stored in small quantities, transmitted, and distributed in discrete quantities.” City of
Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982).
329. Bos. Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. at 398 (“A decision that electricity is a ‘com-
modity’ . . . would further the Congressional purpose to protect small retailers from
being forced out of business by unjustified price discrimination.”).
330. City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1181. Relying on City of Gainesville, the court
summarily found that electricity was a commodity at least for purposes of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. Id. at 1182.
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In City of Gainesville v. Florida Power and Light Co., fourteen Flor-
ida cities brought suit against an electric company alleging that the
electric company violated federal and state anti-trust laws.331 The
plaintiffs conceded that the transmission of electricity was not a com-
modity within the Clayton Act or the Robinson-Patman Act. The
court pointed out that nowhere in those acts did Congress define the
term “commodities.”332 Several lower courts had interpreted the term
“commodity” in reference to the two acts, distinguishing commodities
from intangibles.333
The plaintiffs argued that electricity was tangible because electrons
can be weighed.334 Without a physical or legal analysis of whether
electricity is tangible or movable, the court determined that the “tan-
gible-intangible distinction” does not help in classifying electricity.335
The court held that the Robinson-Patman Act should apply because
electricity “is a product manufactured from other forms of energy”
and distributed through multi-level sales from supplier to retailer.336
As a means to include electricity with other forms of energy commodi-
ties, such as coal, gasoline, and petroleum, the court reasoned that
“Congress did not intend that one form of manufactured energy be
exempt from these antitrust laws while others are not.”337
D. Anti-Trust Anti-Matter
Regardless of surmising congressional intent, it does not follow
physically or legally that when one form of energy is a movable
“good,” all forms of energy are movable “goods.” Physically, electric-
ity is distinct from all other forms of energy. The City of Gainesville
decision is critical of a Fourth Circuit panel and a single judge of the
Fifth Circuit, each assuming that electricity is a commodity or “good”
331. City of Gainesville v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (S.D.
Fla. 1980).
332. Id. at 1280.
333. Id. at 1281. The court noted that intangibles included services rights and privi-
leges. The court also included this citation from the Fifth Circuit: “Legislative history
and subsequent congressional studies clearly indicate that section 2(a) of the Act was
intended to encompass only tangible articles of commerce (citations omitted). In
1957, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee unsuccessfully sought to
amend the Act to define ‘commodities’ as including ‘services rendered by indepen-
dent contractors.’” Id. (citing Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int’l, Inc.,
369 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1966)).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1281–82.
337. Id. at 1282. The court criticized Delmarva and its finding that Congress could
not have intended to make electric power subject to the Robinson-Patman Act be-
cause Congress had a year earlier incorporated anti-discriminatory pricing provisions
in the Federal Power Act.
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without any careful analysis.338 Legally, congressional regulation of
electricity, gas, coal, oil, and renewable power sources are contained
in separate legislation.339
For anti-trust purposes, other forms of energy have been deter-
mined to be commodities within the scope of federal anti-trust stat-
utes, including coal,340 gasoline,341 and natural gas.342 The legislative
history indicates that members of the House Judiciary Committee
sought unsuccessfully to amend the definitions to define anti-trust
“commodities” to include “services.”343 Therefore, with the applica-
tion of anti-trust statutes to electricity, unlike the application of com-
mon law, there is legislative history that services are not included. One
size does not fit all—either in terms of physical reality or law.
In anti-trust decisions, again, there is a split on what electricity is. In
all four anti-trust cases above, the result turns on a rendering of con-
gressional intent of the statute and not on whether electricity physi-
cally or legally fits the definition of the noun used—commodity. The
opinions only briefly analyze electricity.344
And these cases again illustrate inconsistency as to what electricity
is even within a state. For example, in a Massachusetts anti-trust mat-
ter, electricity was deemed to be a “commodity” and not a “ser-
vice,”345 while in contract law matters, Massachusetts determined
electricity to be a “service” and not a “good.”346
VII. CONFUSION CONCLUSION
One does not expect state common law to be identical between all
states. However, the chaos intertwined with electricity is not about the
338. Id. at 1282 (citing Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co., 184 F.2d 552, 559 (4th Cir. 1950)); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Ala. Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 394 F.2d 672, 679–80 (5th Cir. 1968) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
339. See FERREY, supra note 41, §§ 10:3.
340. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 330 (1961) (assuming coal
as a commodity within Clayton Act).
341. F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 529 (1963) (treating automobile gasoline
as within Clayton Act); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 284–86
(S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (holding automobile gasoline and other
petroleum products within Clayton Act).
342. B & W Gas, Inc. v. Gen. Gas Corp., 247 F. Supp. 339, 344–45 (N.D. Ga. 1965)
(assuming natural gas is covered by the Clayton Act).
343. See City of Gainesville v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1281
(S.D. Fla. 1980).
344. City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 773 (D. Del.
1979). In Delmarva, the court spends little time at all discussing the nature of electric-
ity. After finding no case law on the subject, the court determines that the matter “is
one of Congressional intent . . . and the wording of the statute, its legislative history,
and the regulation of the electric utility industry which existed at the time the adop-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act, all suggest that ‘commodity’ was not intended to
encompass electric power.” Id.
345. Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Mass. 1988).
346. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996 WL
406673, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996).
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application of differently evolved state common law rules—the confu-
sion is about a basic physical fact that does not change anywhere in
the United States. Electricity is identical everywhere: It is a rigorously
controlled moving electromagnetic force field at 60 Hz. While physi-
cally more constant and uniform than any other thing in commerce in
the United States, judicial opinions are anything but consistent—bet-
ter described by chaos theory.
The physical reality of electricity does not change depending on
whether the issue is one of contract interpretation, injury in tort,
bankruptcy claims for preferred priority payment regarding electricity
supplied but not paid for, or sanction of anti-competitive behavior.
Nonetheless, there is legal inconsistency as to how electricity is char-
acterized by courts in the same state at different times or under differ-
ent claims. California jurisprudence holds that:
• Electricity is personal property.347
• Electricity is a product (for tort products liability) and may also
be a “good.”348
• Electricity is a service until it is metered.349
• Electricity is an intangible or service.350
There is similar judicial inconsistency in Massachusetts:
• In a Massachusetts anti-trust matter, electricity was deemed to
be a commodity and not a service.351
• In bankruptcy court, electricity was deemed to be a “good.”352
• In contract law matters, Massachusetts determined electricity to
be a service and not a “good.”353
• FERC, in supposedly applying Massachusetts state law to a
Massachusetts electricity contract, without any analysis354 and in
contradiction to the state court determination on a matter exclu-
sively of state law,355 decided that electricity is a “good.”356
347. Hill v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 136 P. 492, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913).
348. Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 292 (1985).
349. Mancuso v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 308 (1991).
350. Appeal of PacifiCorp at 10, In re Appeal of PacifiCorp, No. 90027 (Cal. State
Bd. of Equalization Sept. 12, 2002) (“[T]he sales of electricity here are sales of ser-
vices that essentially consisted of appellant’s setting and keeping in motion, through
its generation and transmission facilities, electrically charged particles. Also as in Otte,
we further conclude that the basic reason the generation and transmission process
employed by appellant is appropriately characterized as a service is that the process
does not result in either (1) the ‘creation’ in its generation facilities of any such argua-
bly tangible particles or (2) the ‘injection’ of those particles into its transmission
facilities.”).
351. Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 676 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Mass. 1988).
352. In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432 B.R. 354, 370 (Bankr. W.D. Mass. 2010).
353. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., No. 95-5321-E, 1996 WL
406673, at *1, 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996).
354. Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Bos. Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,253, at P 61,756
(1989).
355. New Balance, 1996 WL 406673, at *3.
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And a similar legal inconsistency exists in Texas, contrary to what
Massachusetts believes electricity is in different types of matters:
• In a Texas bankruptcy matter, electricity was deemed a service
rather than a “good.”357
• In contract law, Texas determines that electricity is a “good”
rather than a service.358
Several courts have concluded that electricity is a hybrid of “good”
and service depending on at what stage of its transmission one en-
counters it.359 The predominant components that one pays for in a
retail electricity financial transaction often can be costs for transmis-
sion, distribution, and ancillary services, rather than the electricity it-
self, even assuming, arguendo, that the electric commodity is deemed
a “good.”360 Under this predominant factor analysis, “goods” often do
not typically dominate in the financial transaction, and the applicable
rule would conclude that the U.C.C. therefore would not apply.
The intangibility of electricity is a critical legal factor. Despite some
courts finding that electricity is tangible because it can be felt when
touched, this is not always true. The electricity entering a charging
laptop computer is lowered in voltage by more than 90% from the
wall socket voltage, and cannot be experienced by touch, which keeps
consumers from being shocked. Electricity is movable, but so are de-
livered services, ideas which are communicated, and intellectual prop-
erty. There is no critical distinction in movability.
For physical comparison, the sale of water involves a much more
“tangible” and movable asset than the sale of electricity: Water mole-
cules are actually transferred to, and thereafter consumed by, the re-
tail purchaser, whereas no electricity electrons are consumed when
selling or using electricity.361 Even when the provision of water is de-
termined to be a “good” traded under a hybrid “goods” and services
356. Telephone Interview with FERC staff member, supra note 121. FERC staff
indicated that no analysis had been performed, no current staff could recall on what
basis electricity has been treated as a “good,” but that it was convenient.
357. See In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
358. See Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988)
(“We agree with the better reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions which hold elec-
tricity to be a product.” Id. at 785.).
359. “While the distribution of . . . electricity through a system of towers, poles, and
wires may well be considered a service, the electricity itself is a consumable product.”
Hous. Lighting & Power Co., 712 S.W.2d at 766. “The distribution might well be a
service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordinary user, is a con-
sumable product.” Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis.
1979).
360. See, for example, the bill components for National Grid in Massachusetts.
361. By contrast, a wastewater treatment system is often deemed to be predomi-
nantly the sale of the hardware, rather than the associated service. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Weston & Sampson Eng’rs, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 688, 691 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
But see Waste Stream Envtl., Inc. v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm’n, No. 00518D, 2003
WL 917086, *6 n.27 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2003).
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contract, it is dominated by its service component, and thus not sub-
ject to the U.C.C.:
Water is a unique product and is essential to human health and
well-being. Here, the city did not create or manufacture the water.
Rather, the city, by a system of reservoirs, captured the water from
brooks, streams, and rainfall. It treated the water and then distrib-
uted it to its citizens. Although the city charged a sum for the water,
that rate reflected the cost of storage, treatment and distribution.
Thus, it is clear that the predominant factor, thrust, or purpose of
the activity was the rendition of services and not the sale of
goods.362
Water is a more tangible and flexibly movable thing, both physically
and legally, than electricity. If water legally is deemed a service in
terms of its predominant factor, electricity would also seem to be even
more predominantly a service. The Internet, cable TV service, and
phone service are routinely regarded as services and not goods.363
They each utilize the electromagnetic spectrum, as does electricity,
and are the most relevant analogues to electricity. Clearly reasoned
and closely examined decisions, such as that of Justice Wright in
Otte,364 engage in careful analysis of electricity. Yet there remains con-
fusion and no United States Supreme Court decisions to resolve the
legal inconsistency and chaos that encircles rights associated with the
second most important invention in the history of the world.365
But this chaos should not be hard-wired into the judicial future. De-
spite the convenient measurement at the point of metering, measure-
ment does not change the fundamental physical nature and flow of
electricity. Electricity does not become a product rather than a service
sold by passing through a meter. X-rays administered at a hospital use
electromagnetic force moved to your body, which tangibly reacts to
the radiation and is carefully measured to control the dose or radia-
tion, but x-rays would not be considered a “good” that the patient
purchased, despite their tangibility, movement, and measurement.
Making a distinction that identical electricity somehow is transformed
362. Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 775 N.E.2d 770, 784 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
363. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 1996);
Daleure v. Kentucky, 269 F.3d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding telephone services
were not “goods”); Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1131,
1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding long distance voice communication services were not
commodities to which the Robinson-Patman Act applied but instead were “services”);
see also Rankin Cty. Cablevision v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 692 F.
Supp. 691, 692–93 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that cable television service was not a
commodity); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Commc’ns Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1114
(S.D. Miss. 1976) (discussing the purchase and sale of television signal programming
and finding that no sale or purchase of any tangible commodity was involved for pur-
poses of the Robinson-Patman Act, which “only relates to the sale of tangible com-
modities and not to services”).
364. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838–39 (Ohio 1988).
365. Fallows, supra note 2, at 58.
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from a service to a “good,” commodity, or product at the meter is
jurisprudence at odds with scientific reality:
More fundamentally, none of the utilities can show that, through
the use of this equipment, the utility makes something new and dif-
ferent, whether it generates the electricity or buys the electricity
from others. Though volts and amperes may change during the
transmission and distribution, not every change is “manufacturing.”
The total amount of electric energy does not change very much
from the point of generation to the points of use. Electric energy is
sold by its producers and distributors in quantities of power over a
time period, commonly expressed as “kilowatt-hours” or “mega-
watt-hours.” A kilowatt of power can be 100 volts at 10 amperes, or
it can be 1,000 volts at one ampere. The product is the same; only its
measurements change. By either measure it is the same product,
and nearly the same total amount of product. The essential charac-
ter of electricity—the aggregation of subatomic particles that utili-
ties can generate, transmit, distribute, measure and sell—is not
changed by the equipment at issue here. Nothing is added and noth-
ing is subtracted in the transmission and distribution process.366
Nor is there a persuasive change from a service to a “good” or prod-
uct when electricity is transformed from 13 kV or 480 volts in the dis-
tribution line to enter the customer premises at 110 volts, as some
courts have concluded.367 Many consumer appliances elevate the volt-
age: A cathode ray tube in a conventional television operates at sev-
eral thousand volts, hospital equipment can operate at 5,000 volts or
more, and even home electric dryers operate at an elevated 240
volts.368 Once transformed again to a higher voltage, if we adopt volt-
age as the key legal variable, does that particular electricity again
change from a “good” back to a service? No.
The policy motivation for some precedent may be that a utility dis-
tributing electric power is regarded by some as a quasi-public func-
tionary, reallocating the large amount of group resources which flow
through the utility each month to certain parties. Utilities traditionally
operated as monopolies which could spread any liability and costs in-
curred as business expenses over a broad base of every household in
their monopolized geographic area. This is not true today, with twenty
states breaking the retail monopoly of their utilities,369 and FERC
366. Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 75 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Mo. 2001) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted). Petitioner utilities sought a sales tax exemption for cer-
tain equipment used in the transmission and distribution of electricity. See id. at 729.
The utilities petitioned for review of the decision of the Missouri Administrative
Commission in favor of respondent Missouri Director of Revenue. Id. at 725.
367. See supra Section IV.C.
368. Author’s information from Dr. Joseph Leung, formerly at Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital.
369. See supra Figure 1.
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breaking the wholesale power and transmission monopoly of
utilities.370
A view that electricity is a differentiated product or tangible “good”
may be antiquated.371 For the last century of its 135 years of existence,
electricity has not changed or varied in the U.S. as a constant uniform
electromagnetic field transmitted at 60 Hz AC (60 cycles per sec-
ond).372 Electricity is an identical force field in every state, in every
transaction, and at every moment of time.373 The electromagnetic
force, as a primary universal force of quantum field theory, can both
cause ripples in the fabric of space-time,374 and when sold, is mea-
sured throughout the world as a function of the time of its use.
Neither time, nor an invisible force, typically is considered by the law
as a product or “good.”
Legal distinctions with regard to electricity become increasingly im-
portant in this era of retail electric sector deregulation, with individual
state common law and court interpretation replacing systematized
regulation by FERC and the states. Restructuring and deregulation of
the retail electric power sector, which commenced at the state level in
approximately 1997, dramatically changed the regulatory paradigm.375
About 40% of the states restructured or deregulated prior to the elec-
370. In Order No. 888, FERC established the foundation for the development of
competitive bulk power markets. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21, 540 (May 10, 1996) (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385).
In Order No. 2000, FERC encouraged the development of Regional Transmission
Organizations to form “competitive wholesale electric markets,” that had to incorpo-
rate non-discriminatory transmission service. Regional Transmission Organizations,
Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 (1999), on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000), petitions for review dismissed, Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash. v. F.E.R.C., 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
In Order No. 890, the Commission amended the Order No. 888 pro forma tariff to
require transmission providers to plan for the needs of their customers on a compara-
ble basis to planning for their own needs. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Pref-
erence in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12266 (Mar. 15, 2007), on
reh’g, Order No. 890-A, 73 Fed. Reg. 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), on reh’g, Order No. 890-B,
123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 (2008), on reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61228 (2009).
In Order No. 1000, FERC required not favoring of incumbent utility transmission
owners in building new transmissin capacity. Transmission Planning and Cost Alloca-
tion by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 136
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051 (2011), order on reh’g, Order No. 1000-A, 139 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,132,
order on reh’g and clarification, Order No. 1000-B, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,044 (2012).
371. Until the early twentieth century, electricity was supplied by different suppli-
ers at different voltages ranging from 100–600 volts and 40–133 cycles per second. For
the past century, it is standardized throughout the United States by regulation at a set
frequency of 60 mH and it does not vary. For a history of electric power, see FERREY,
supra note 20, at Appendix A.
372. WORLD ELECTRICITY STANDARDS, supra note 23.
373. Its voltage can be easily transformed for various purposes.
374. GREENE, supra note 24, at 197.
375. Id. at 149–50.
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tric sector problems in California in 2000–2001, whereafter the other
60% of the states retained traditionally structured retail electric sec-
tors.376 As noted by the federal courts and affirmed by the Supreme
Court, independent market participants now sell the bulk of U.S.
power pursuant to the rules of contract law.377
At the bottom line, on something as ubiquitous and critical as elec-
tricity, one needs consistent jurisprudence to reconcile the random-
ness and chaos theory surrounding power. With electricity occupying
unprecedented and increasing historical importance, courts must ana-
lyze what electricity actually is, for which this Article has highlighted
significant physical and legal aspects.378 After more than a century of
widespread use of electric power, workable precedent requires the
convergence of interpretation to conform substantial judicial inconsis-
tency. This chaos need not be hard-wired into our electric future.
376. See Ferrey, supra note 8, at 218–19.
377. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash. v. F.E.R.C., 471 F.3d 1053,
1066–67 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Distr. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash., 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
378. See supra Part II.
